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Abstract: We propose a novel approach to the analysis of organizations by developing a 
computerized platform that reproduces relevant features of existing organizations such 
as real-effort tasks and real-leisure alternative activities (Internet). In this environment, 
we find strong incentives effects as organizations using individual incentives 
significantly outperform those relying on team incentives. Combining real-time peer 
monitoring with team incentives, we report striking evidence of positive peer effects as 
production increases by 50% and Internet usage decreases by 54% compared with 
organizations using team incentives alone. Peer monitoring allows virtual organizations 
using team incentives to perform as well as those using individual incentives. However, 
the positive effect of peer monitoring does not apply to low performers. 
 
Keywords: team incentives, free-riding, monitoring, peer pressure, virtual organization 
JEL codes: C9, D23, J0, J41 
                                            
1 Virtual Organization was presented in January 2010 at GATE-CNRS Lyon and in February 2010 in Paris School 
of Economics. The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from IFREE. This project has been developed 
under the name of Virtual Organization by CYDeveloper LLC starting December 2008.  
2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Bringing the organization into the laboratory 
In this paper, we propose an innovative tool for the empirical study of organizations that may 
serve as a common tool for multiple disciplines ranging from Sociology to Organizational 
Economics. Such disciplines have generally used different empirical methods including field and 
case studies as well as laboratory experiments. To that end, we build on previous research in 
Experimental Economics and develop a computerized organizational environment that allows for 
both tight experimenter control and a high level of realism. We believe this is a crucial step in 
order to overcome the usual critique toward laboratory experiments stated explicitly in Falk and 
Heckman (2009, p. 1): “There is also a widespread view that the lab produces unrealistic data, 
which lacks relevance for understanding the “real world”.” The wide acceptance of the 
experimental methodology as an acceptable alternative to the analysis of field data may result 
from the design of laboratory environments that closely reproduce important features of field 
settings. Recent studies have stressed sharp differences between field and laboratory behaviors in 
the case of professional bidders (Harrison and List (2008)) or in the case of professional sports 
players and college students (Levitt, List and Riley (2010)). These studies emphasize that the 
rejection of standard minmax game theory predictions in the laboratory, despite its prevalence in 
the field, may be explained by the gap between field environments and their abstract 
representation in the laboratory. 
The challenge is to develop laboratory settings that are sufficiently close to field environments 
while maintaining the ability to control the different features of the decision environment 
(Charness and Kuhn (2011), Falk and Fehr (2003), Falk and Heckman (2009)). The need for 
control is critical because the analysis of fundamental aspects of organizations such as incentives  
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schemes (Laffont and Martimort (2002) for a review), hierarchies (Qian (1994), Radner (1992), 
Williamson (1967)), monitoring (Alchian and Demsetz (1972)) or delegation of authority 
(Aghion and Tirole (1997), Van den Steen (2009)) are likely to be affected by confounding 
factors like peer pressure effects, corporate culture, implicit contracts and influence costs. This 
need for control may account for the increasing popularity of laboratory experiments in the field 
of Labor Economics (Charness and Kuhn (2011)). The experimental approach has permitted a 
direct test of microeconomic models (Falk and Heckman (2009)) and has allowed researchers to 
identify a series of practically relevant behavioral mechanisms such as equity concerns and 
reciprocal motives.
2 Nevertheless, laboratory experiments inherently lack external validity due to 
their simplification of the work environment (Charness and Kuhn (2011)). For example, in a 
standard principal-agent experiment, the agent’s level of effort would be assimilated to a 
monetary cost. The use of abstract effort has been complemented by a large number of studies 
that have incorporated real-effort tasks such as solving mazes (Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini 
(2003)), puzzles (Rutström and Williams (2000)), anagrams (Charness and Villeval (2009)), 
optimization problems (Dickinson and Villeval (2008), Montmarquette et al. (2004), van Dijk, 
Sonnemans and van Winden (2001)) or mailing tasks (Carpenter, Matthews and Schirm (2010), 
Falk and Ichino (2006)).
3 Other works have attempted to raise the external validity of laboratory 
experiments by considering different subject pools such as soldiers (Fehr et al. (1998)) 
manufacturing workers (Barr and Serneels (2009)) or retirees (Charness and Villeval (2009)). 
These works show that the prevalence of social preferences and reciprocal behaviors is not 
                                            
2 These features have been introduced in the theory of incentives (Dur and Glazer (2008), Englmaier and 
Wambach (2010), Kandel and Lazear (1992), Rotemberg (1994)). 
3 Van Dijk, Sonnemans and van Winden (2001) stress that real effort and abstract effort are not equivalent as 
individuals may derive utility from certain tasks. For example, people may be willing to give their time to charities 
while not willing to donate money to the same organizations.  
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confined to student participants.
4 Another strategy that aims at increasing external validity 
consists in the development of natural and field experiments in the workplace (Bandiera, 
Barankay and Rasul (2005), Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2007), Fehr and Goette (2007), 
Knez and Simester (2001), Lazear (2000), Shearer (2004)). As is emphasized in Charness and 
Kuhn (2011) there is no clear evidence that the prevalence of social preferences documented in 
laboratory settings is also observed in the field. For example, Gneezy and List (2006) and 
Fershtman, Gneezy, and List (2009) put forward the limited importance of reciprocal behaviors 
and social preferences in the field. Nevertheless, Bellemare and Shearer (2009) report that a one-
time monetary gift increased tree-planters’ productivity on the day of the gift.  
In this paper, we propose an alternative tool for the empirical analysis of organizational issues 
that aims at combining the strengths of field studies with those of laboratory experiments. To that 
end, we design a computerized platform that reproduces relevant features of real-world 
organizations while ensuring tight experimenter control over the different elements of the 
environment.
5 We introduce a framework with a real-effort organizational task, real-leisure 
activities as well as a real-time supervision technology. At the same time we maintain tight 
control over the organizational features studied by the experimenter in line with standard 
laboratory experiments. We consider two applications of our computerized platform that are 
related to the method of incentives and to the method of persuasion as defined by Barnard (1938) 
in the following quotation. 
An organization can secure the efforts necessary to its existence, then, either by the 
objective inducements it provides or by changing states of mind. . . . We shall call the 
                                            
4 Nevertheless, notable differences exist between subject pools as is found in Charness and Villeval (2009) when 
comparing cooperative behaviors of seniors and juniors in a team production game. 
5 We refer to our organizations as being virtual in line with the following definition: “being on or simulated on a 
computer or computer network” (Merriam-Webster dictionary).  
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process of offering objective incentives “the method of incentives”; and the processes of 
changing subjective attitudes “the method of persuasion.” 
—Barnard (1938, p. 142) 
We will compare individual and team incentives as an application of “the method of 
incentives” while considering the analysis of peer effects as an application derived from “the 
method of persuasion”. 
 
1.2. Team Incentives in the Theory of Organizations 
As a point of departure for the analysis of organizations and the development of an economic 
theory of the firm, theorists have studied issues of asymmetric information in the context of 
teams (Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Holmström (1982)). In particular, these authors put forward 
the pervasiveness of free-riding behaviors in teams in which it is difficult to observe and verify 
the contribution of each partner. Indeed, workers paid according to an aggregate measure of 
performance such as team output are likely to exert less effort than if they were paid according to 
their individual performance. A central feature of successful organizations consists of 
overcoming free riding by designing effective monitoring schemes (Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972)) or using budget-breaking devices aimed at threatening potential free riders (Holmström 
(1982)).
6,7 
At the empirical level, the evidence of free riding behavior in teams has been limited 
(Encinosa, Gaynor and Rebitzer (2007), Gaynor and Pauly (1990), Leibowitz and Tollison 
(1980), Newhouse (1973)). Instead, team incentives have been found to be particularly effective 
                                            
6 Che and Yoo (2001) have also shown that free riding in teams can be eliminated when considering long-term 
horizons. 
7 Notice that an important element in the development of the incentives-based theory of the firm is the multi-tasking 
problem (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991, 1994)). In the present study, we set aside multi-tasking issues.  
6 
as is reported in laboratory experiments (Dohmen and Falk (2011), van Dijk, Sonnemans and van 
Winden (2001)) as well as in field studies (Dumaine (1990, 1994), Hamilton, Nickerson and 
Owan (2003), Hansen (1997), Ichniowski et al. (1996), Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997), 
Kruse (1992), Manz and Sims (1993)).
8 For example, Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003) 
show that equal sharing of production bonuses within teams seems to stimulate cooperation, 
information sharing, monitoring and even mutual training, generating a productivity increase 
(relative to piece rates) despite the expected free-rider problem. The empirical difficulty to 
identify free-riding behaviors in teams is likely due to the lack of control over crucial aspects of 
work teams that act as confounding factors such as peer monitoring, interpersonal relations or 
communication. For example, in the context of public good games, peer punishments (Fehr and 
Gächter (2000), Masclet et al. (2003), Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2007)) as well as 
communication (Bochet, Page and Putterman (2006), Isaac and Walker (1988), Sally (1995)) 
have been recognized as effective mechanisms to increase contributions. 
The comparison of individual and team incentives constitutes a necessary starting point to 
assess the importance of incentives setting in organizations. Indeed, not identifying any 
differences in performance between organizations using individual incentives and those using 
team incentives would represent an important challenge for the theory of incentives. In this study 
and in line with previous laboratory experiments, we are able to compare team and individual 
incentives while controlling for team-specific features that may interfere in the empirical 
assessment of team incentives. A crucial difference between our experimental environment and 
standard experimental works is the introduction of long and real-effort work tasks as well as real-
time access to leisure activities (Internet). The introduction of real-leisure alternative activities 
                                            
8 Empirical evidence on the positive effect of incentives schemes on performance (Booth and Frank (1999), Lazear 
(2000), and Prendergast (1999)) do not analyze individual and team incentives independently.  
7 
appears to be pertinent as we find that subjects are indeed willing to undertake on-the-job leisure 
activities for which they are not paid by the experimenter. In particular, subjects spent 15.4% of 
their time browsing the Internet when they were paid according to individual incentives. 
Additionally, the proportion of time subjects dedicated to browsing the Internet increased from 
9.6% in the first period to 19% in the last two periods. This first observation shows that our 
environment is likely to be appropriate to identify shirking behaviors in organizations using team 
incentives. 
We confirm this conjecture by comparing organizations using team incentives and those using 
individual incentives. Production levels were on average 52% higher and Internet usage was 46% 
lower under individual incentives than under team incentives. This result was driven by 
extensive shirking behaviors in the team incentives treatment in which subjects spent on average 
28.5% of their time browsing the Internet. This percentage reached 35% in the last hour of the 
experiment. 
This first result is crucial as it shows that increasing the level of realism in the experimental 
environment leads to results that are consistent with incentives theory (see Holmström (1979), 
and Laffont and Martimort (2002) for a review). Our findings are in line with the sound premise 
that performance is increased by the use of high-powered incentives schemes. 
The introduction of Internet as an alternative leisure activity as well as the introduction of a 
clicking task that gives rewards to subjects just for the sake of being at their workstation are 
crucial elements of our environments that participate in making shirking as salient as working. 
Indeed, subjects spent a considerable amount of their time browsing the Internet and a significant 
proportion of them did not produce anything (21.7% under team incentives and 12.1% under 
individual incentives).  
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As a second step of our analysis, we introduced a real-time monitoring technology in our 
virtual organizations so as to analyze whether the poor performance of team incentives could be 
mitigated by peer pressure. 
 
1.3. Supervision and Peer-monitoring in the Theory of Organizations 
Supervision is an important aspect of the theory of the firm that was mentioned by preeminent 
scholars as one of the raison d'être of organizations (Barzel (1982), Chandler (1992), Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)). Alchian and Demsetz (1972) put forward the need for centralized supervision 
in a context of asymmetric information between managers and their subordinates in a team 
context. The authors argue that supervision should be performed by a residual claimant so as to 
provide the monitor with adequate incentives to supervise. By gathering information about the 
agents, the monitor will be able to pay employees according to their individual contribution. 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) put forward that peer monitoring is not an efficient mechanism 
because the agents would tend to shy away from monitoring activities. However, other theories 
view peer monitoring as a highly-effective mechanism (Carpenter, Bowles and Gintis (2009), 
Kandel and Lazear (1992)). Kandel and Lazear stress the role of shame arising when workers 
produce less than the group average as an important mechanism in understanding the 
effectiveness of peer pressure. Carpenter, Bowles and Gintis (2009) emphasize the role of 
negative reciprocity as a behavioral mechanism leading contributors to voluntary incur private 
costs to punish free riders. Evidence of such behaviors has been found in public good 
experiments (Fehr and Gächter (2000), Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2007)). Grosse, Putterman 
and Rockenbach (2008) stress the popularity of peer monitoring devices in a modified version of 
the public good game. In their experiment, subjects completed a public good game and then  
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decided how much to invest in a monitoring technology which precision determined the 
allocation of team profits. The authors found that subjects mostly relied on peer monitoring as a 
disciplining device. However, specialist monitoring emerged when the monetary cost of 
monitoring by team members was greater than the cost associated with specialist monitoring. 
Positive peer effects have been reported in a series of recent field experiments. Falk and 
Ichino (2006) found that students who worked for fixed wages to stuff envelopes performed 
significantly better when working in pairs than when working alone. Mas and Moretti (2009) 
studied the case of supermarket cashiers and found positive peer effects on the number of items 
scanned by cashiers. The authors considered workers’ visual contact and frequency of 
interactions as measures of peer pressure. In a related field work, Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul 
(2005) found that mutual monitoring led fruit pickers to reduce their productivity when they 
were paid according to relative performance. The authors interpret this result as evidence of 
workers partially internalizing the negative externality of their production on the pay of their co-
workers. 
In the field studies described previously, not only did experimenters not have access to precise 
measures of peer pressure, they also did not have control over the monitoring process. Peer 
pressure was assessed by a variety of observable measures such as visual contact, physical 
proximity or frequency of interactions. In this paper, we bring real-time supervision in a 
controlled laboratory environment so as to enable the experimenter to measure peer pressure 
with precision. In particular, we are able to record the amount of time subjects spent watching 
others as well as discern the identity of the subjects who were watching others. 
Our peer monitoring technology is characterized by the fact that each team member could 
monitor their peers’ activities at any point in time during the experiment. As a result, subjects  
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could shape their monitoring strategy by deciding upon which subjects to monitor and when to 
do so.
9 Monitors were informed in real-time about the activities undertaken by supervisees and 
could therefore identify whether they were browsing the Internet or producing for the 
organization. It is important to note that subjects were notified on their screen whenever they 
were being watched by others. This feature induced social pressure that is considered to be an 
important aspect of peer monitoring (Mas and Moretti (2009)). In that respect, our monitoring 
technology was more intrusive than the mere release of feedback about relative performance 
introduced in recent experimental works (Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011), Eriksson, Poulsen 
and Villeval (2009), Kuhnen and Tymula (2009)).
10 These studies on feedback are related to 
early works in the Psychology literature starting with the development of the social comparison 
theory (Festinger (1954)).
11 Festinger proposes that individuals try to assess their performance 
with respect to others’ when they lack an objective means for evaluation. Upward comparison, 
learning that others perform better than one, generally raises motivation as well as effort and 
performance (Blanton, Buunk, Gibbons and Kuyper (1999), Seta (1982), Smither, London and 
Reilly (2005), Wood (1989)). However, the evidence regarding the effect of feedback on 
performance is mixed (Alvero, Bucklin and Austin (2001), Balcazar, Hopkins and Suarez (1985), 
Kluger and DeNisi (1996)).
12 
Our controlled environment offers a single opportunity to provide a detailed analysis of peer 
monitoring activities. We first report that a large proportion of subjects (88.3%) decided to 
                                            
9 This endogenous aspect of our monitoring technology can be linked to search experiments in which subjects decide 
whether to observe or not their relative performance (Burks et al. (2010), Falk, Huffman and Sunde (2006)). 
10 Using both piece-rate and tournament incentive schemes, Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval (2009) do not report 
significant effect of feedback on individual performance. Nevertheless, other studies show that social comparison 
may lead people to exert more effort in tournaments (Kuhnen and Tymula (2009)) or in the context of individual 
incentives (Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011)). The positive effect of feedback in tournaments has been modeled by 
Kräkel (2008).  
11 Extensions of the social comparison theory have been developed (see Suls, Martin and Wheeler (2002) for a 
review). 
12 A significant number of studies find null or even negative effects on performance.   
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monitor others. However, subjects dedicated only a small proportion of their time (4.4%) to 
monitoring, compared with the proportion of their time subjects spent working (82.5%) or 
browsing the Internet (13.1%). Yet, all subjects were being watched for at least 12 minutes 
during the experiment and for an average of 22.4% of their time. Team members seemed to share 
the monitoring burden as only 11.7% of them did not supervise their peers at any time. In 
addition, subjects spent the same amount of time monitoring others regardless of their 
performance on the work task. 
We find evidence of strong peer pressure effects when comparing organizations endowed 
with peer monitoring and team incentives with organizations relying on team incentives alone. 
Production was 50% higher and Internet usage was 54% lower under peer monitoring. In 
contrast to public good games with monetary punishments (Carpenter (2007a, 2007b), Fehr and 
Gächter (2000)), both effort and efficiency were increased by the introduction of peer 
monitoring.
13 This was the case because subjects spent little time watching others while sharing 
the monitoring burden so as to limit the cost of monitoring. 
Peer monitoring combined with team incentives led to levels of performance and Internet 
usage that were remarkably similar to individual incentives, despite the absence in our design of 
punishments devices, communication technologies or physical proximity among subjects. 
Nevertheless, peer pressure was ineffective in raising the production of low performers although 
they spent more time working on the task and less time browsing the Internet than in the team 
incentives treatment. We relate this result to Zajonc’s social facilitation theory (1965, 1980) 
according to which low performers are likely to become more active but less accurate when 
being monitored. 
                                            
13 In public good games, despite the cost of punishments incurred by participants, efficiency may be achieved in the 
long run (Gächter, Renner and Sefton (2008)).  
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This paper is organized as follows. The experimental design is detailed in the next section 
while results are presented in Section III. Concluding remarks are presented in Section IV. 
 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
2.1. Virtual Organization With Real Effort and Real Leisure 
The core of our methodology is the design of a computerized platform that reproduces crucial 
features of real-world work environments.  We develop a framework in which subjects can 




2.1.1. The Work Task 
We introduce a particularly long and laborious task so as to reduce as much as possible the 
role of intrinsic motivation in our environment. Indeed, subjects may like certain tasks and derive 
direct utility from undertaking the activity. By using a long, repetitive and effortful task we 
ensure that individual performance is mostly driven by effort considerations. We do so because 
our main objective is to test standard predictions of incentives theory while abstracting from 
confounding factors such as intrinsic motivation. The duration of our task as well as its intricacy 
were considerably higher than in previous real-effort experiments that have reported the use of 
counting tasks (Dohmen and Falk (2011), Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval (2009), Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007)).
15 Subjects were asked to sum up matrices of 36 numbers for 1 hour and 40 
                                            
14 A video presentation of the software is available at http://sites.google.com/site/virtualorganization/videos. 
15 Different variations of this task have been used by Bartling, Fehr, Maréchal and Schunk (2009) and Dohmen and 
Falk (2010). A counting task that consisted of summing up the number of zeros in a table randomly filled with ones 
and zeros was also used in Falk and Huffman (2007). A long typing task was used by Dickinson’s (1999) 
experiment in which subjects had to come during four days for two-hour experiments. Falk and Ichino (2006) used a 
four-hour mailing task in their field experiment on peer effects.  
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minutes while Niederle and Vesterlund used a 5-minute task and Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval 
used a 20-minute task. The duration of our task was also ten times longer than the multiplication 
task used in Dohmen and Falk (2011). As a result, we expected to identify signs of fatigue and 
boredom during the experiment.  
In the work task, participants were not allowed to use a pen, scratch paper or calculator. This 
rule amplified the level of effort subjects had to exert in order to complete tables correctly. Each 
table had 6 rows and 6 columns. The numbers in each table were generated randomly. In each 
period, the first 5 tables were filled with numbers between 0 and 5 while the following 3 tables 
were filled with numbers between 5 and 9. The remaining tables were filled with one-decimal 
numbers between 0.0 and 1.0. The increase in the difficulty of the tables was again motivated by 
the willingness to design a particularly laborious work task.
16 An example is shown in Figure 1. 
 
FIGURE 1.—Example of table summation for the work task. 
Before providing the final sum of all numbers in the table in the yellow cell, participants had 
to fill in the 12 blue cells that could be used to sum each row and each column separately. Filling 
in these cells did not directly generate earnings but could help subjects compute the final sum. 
Only the final answer was rewarded although intermediate sums of all rows and columns were 
required but did not generate payoffs. Each table completed correctly generated a 40-cent profit 
while a penalty of 20 cents was subtracted from individual production for each incorrect 
                                            
16 We believe that, given the limited duration of laboratory experiments, the use of long and laborious tasks are 
necessary to create boredom and fatigue.   
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answer.
17 After each subject completed a table, the accumulated individual production was 
updated so that subjects knew whether their answer was correct or not. At the end of each period, 
and only then, the total amount of money generated by all 10 participants’ work task during the 
period was displayed in the history panel located at the bottom of the subjects’ screen. 
At any point during the experiment, participants could switch from the work task to the leisure 
activity that consisted of browsing the Internet. Each activity was undertaken separately, in a 
different screen. To switch from one activity to another subjects simply had to click on the 
corresponding option of the action menu displayed on their screen (see Figure 2). 
 
2.1.2. Internet Browsing 
Participants were informed that their usage of the Internet was strictly confidential and could 
not be recorded. Subjects were free to consult their email or visit any web page.
18 Internet 
browsing and the work task were undertaken on different screens so that subjects could not 
complete tables while being on the Internet. Switching back and forth between the Internet 
browser and the work task was quick and easy. Subjects who returned to the Internet screen after 
working on the task were automatically directed to the last web page they visited.
19 The Internet 
browser was embedded in the software (see Figure 2) so that the experimenter could keep record 
of the switching times between activities as well as the exact amount of time subjects spent on 
each activity.
20 
                                            
17 Penalties did not apply when individual production was equal to zero so that individual production could not be 
negative. 
18 Subjects were expected to follow the norms set by the university regarding the use of Internet in the campus. 
19 For example, a subject could decide to go to the work task while writing an email and return to the Internet 
browser to finish and send the email. 
20 JxBrowser Version 2.3, TeamDev Ltd.  
15 
 
FIGURE 2.—Embedded Internet screen. 
The introduction of Internet in our virtual organizations is motivated by the widespread use of 
Internet at the workplace. According to a 2005 study by American Online and Salary.com, 
employees spend about 26% of their time on activities unrelated to their work (Malachowski 
(2005)).
21 Almost half of this time actually corresponds to Internet usage.
22 In addition, a study 
by Nielsen/Net Ratings report that people spend more than twice as much time online at the 
office as they do at home (Farrell (2000)). Gordon (2000) argues that Internet usage in the 
workplace may damage employees’ productivity (see also Young (2005, 2006)). 
An appealing feature of Internet as an alternative to the work task is the wide range of 
activities that can be completed online. Indeed, a large number of people are likely to derive 
utility from Internet access as they will be able to browse Web pages that best correspond to their 
favorite hobbies. In addition, the use of Internet is widespread regardless of gender, age or 
income.
23 According to Jones (2002) and Jones et al. (2009) the use of Internet among university 
                                            
21 “Wasted Time At Work Costing Companies Billions”, San Francisco Chronicle, July 11, 2005, discussing the 
findings of the AOL/Salary.com study: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2005/07/11/wastingtime.TMP  
22 Similar estimates are provided by a 2005 study by Web@Work. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/BUSINESS/05/19/web.work/index.html 
23 See the 2007 survey by Pew Internet & American Life Project and eMarketer: 
http://www.ignitesocialmedia.com/social-media-stats/internet-usage-by-age-gender-race  
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students has increased significantly in the last years. Jones et al. (2009) found that 94% of 
college students spend at least one hour on the Internet every day, and 53% spend three or more 
hours.
24 Furthermore, Internet is not restricted to a specific kind of leisure as opposed to simply 
playing a video game, reading a newspaper or listening to music. All of these activities and more 
are available through the Internet. Looking at the most visited Web sites by college students 
gives us an idea of the great variety of options available on the Internet.
25 In addition, Jones et al. 
(2009) find that students access the Internet several times during the day and at nonspecific 
times.  
Furthermore, devising environments that include features of real-world organizations such as 
on-the-job Internet usage may reduce demand effects in the laboratory (Zizzo (2010)).
26 Indeed, 
the use of Internet as an alternative activity as well may lead people to consider that shirking is 
an equally salient alternative to working. 
The consideration of leisure-related issues in the experimental literature was introduced in the 
analysis of labor supply by Dickinson (1999). The objective of the author was to assess both 
income and substitution effects using laboratory experiments. Participants had to undertake a 
two-hour typing task on three different days. In one of the two treatments (the combined 
experiment), subjects could leave the laboratory whenever they had achieved a certain output 
level. This aimed at capturing off-the-job leisure activities. Falk and Huffman (2007) also 
                                            
24 Harris Interactive’s “360 College Explorer Outlook Study” in 2002 found that Internet is the most common 
activity among students, with 98% of students going online at least a few times a week, and spending on average 
almost 10 hours per week on the Net (http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID=441). 
25 The ten most visited Web sites are Facebook, ESPN, Google, CNN, YouTube, MSN, Hulu, StumbleUpon, 
Pandora and Craiglist for male students and Facebook, Google, Yahoo!, PerezHilton.com, MySpace, School’s site, 
CNN, AOL, eBay and The Superficial for college girls (Youth Trends, “The Top Ten List Report: College Q3 
2008,” http://ldsmediatalk.com/2009/02/16/internet-use-among-teens-vs-college-students/). 
26 In addition, subjects faced computerized instructions and were not interacting with the experimenter except for the 
unlikely case in which questions were raised by subjects. The great majority of subjects (we estimate this proportion 
to be around 95%) would typically never ask questions. We think this is partly explained by the intuitive structure of 
our environment.  
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introduced the possibility for subjects to quit the experiment when analyzing minimum wages 
and workfare in the laboratory. However, it is difficult to interpret the heterogeneity in quitting 
behaviors given the lack of control over subjects’ activities outside the laboratory. Ours is the 
first experimental design that embeds on-the-job leisure activities into the work environment and 




2.1.3. The Clicking Task 
In addition to the previously mentioned activities, each subject could click on a yellow box 
moving from left to right at the bottom of their screen. This task was referred to as Task 1. Each 
time a subject clicked on the yellow box he or she earned 5 cents. Subjects’ earnings obtained 
from clicking the box were displayed on the screen and updated each time they clicked on the 
yellow box. The box appeared at the bottom of a subject’s screen every 25 seconds whether a 
subject was on the work task or browsing the Internet. The yellow box always appeared first on 
the left hand side of the screen, and moved to the right (see Figure 3). It remained during 4 
seconds in the first cell on the left and then moved to the next cell for another 4 seconds if the 
subject had not clicked on the box. This means that the box was visible on the screen for a total 
of 20 seconds or until a subject clicked on it. Given that the experiment consisted of 5 periods of 
20 minutes each, subjects could earn a total of $12.00 just by clicking on all the 240 yellow 
boxes that appeared on the screen during the experiment.  
                                            
27 Two related studies (Charness, Masclet and Villeval (2010), Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval (2009)) have also 
introduced on-the-job leisure activities in experimental environments by giving subjects access to magazines. 
However, the leisure activity was not embedded in the computerized platform.  
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FIGURE 3.—The clicking task. 
This task aimed at representing the pay that workers may obtain just for being at their 
workstation. One can see this activity as a way to endogenize the show-up fee.
28 A crucial 
motivation for the introduction of the clicking task was to add realism to our experimental design 
by allowing subjects to collect a constant flow of earnings without being actually working. In 
each period, subjects could earn up to $2.40 by clicking on the yellow boxes. 
 
2.2. Virtual Organization: Real-time Monitoring 
Another crucial feature of our experimental environement is the introduction of real-time 
supervision. In the peer monitoring treatment, subjects were able monitor others’ activities in 
real time. Our objective was to design an environment that allows for the emergence of peer 
effects that were defined by Charness and Kuhn (2011) as follows: “…pure peer effects refer to a 
situation where workers work, side by side, for the same firm but do not interact in any way 
(except that they observe each others’ work activity).”  
To that end, we allowed subjects to monitor others’ activities at any time during the 
experiment by selecting the Watch option in their action menu. In that respect, our monitoring 
technology offered a unique opportunity to assess the effect of peer pressure over time and 
examine the conjecture that peer effects are likely to fade away as time passes (Falk and Ichino 
(2006)).  
                                            
28 Notice that subjects were also paid the standard laboratory show-up fee of $7.  
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Monitoring activities had to be undertaken in a separate screen so that subjects could not 
complete the work task or the leisure activity while monitoring others.
29 As a result, monitoring 
imposed an opportunity cost on watchers that was different in nature from the monetary cost of 
punishments in public good games (Fehr and Gächter (2000)). In the monitoring screen, subjects 
could decide whether to monitor only a subset or all the other subjects at the same time. The 
information was displayed in a table, where each column showed information regarding the 
activities completed by a given subject (see Figure 4). 
 
FIGURE 4.—Monitoring screen with a zoom on subject B13. 
The header of each column indicated the subject’s experiment ID. Each cell of a given 
column displayed information in real time about the activities undertaken by the selected subject. 
These activities were labeled as follows: Watch (monitoring others subjects’ activities), Internet 
(browsing the web) or Task 2 (undertaking the work task). Monitors were also informed 
whenever a subject entered a number in the blue cells of a table in order to sum a column or a 
row before providing a final answer for the work task. This was described as Sum Column in the 
monitoring table. Finally, the current production of monitored subjects as well as their 
contribution to the work task (in % terms) were shown in the monitoring screen. For example, in 
Figure 4, subject B13 was monitored while entering the sum of the rows and columns in the work 
task (Sum Column) before providing a final answer (Answer Task 2). The answer provided was 
correct since B13’s production increased to 40.00¢. At the same time, the contribution of subject 
                                            
29 Subjects could still click on the yellow box while monitoring others.  
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B13 to the work task increased from nothing to one-third. Notice that after completing the table 
correctly, subject B13 switched to the Internet screen with 13 minutes and 21 seconds remaining 
in the period. 
Subjects were notified with a message stating the experiment ID of the watcher jointly with an 
eye picture whenever they were being watched. The message and the icon were displayed at the 
bottom of the subjects’ screens as in Figure 5. This feature induced social pressure that is 
considered as an important aspect of peer monitoring (Mas and Moretti (2009)). In that respect, 
our monitoring technology was more intrusive than, for example, the release of feedback about 
relative performance (Blanes i Vidal and Nossol (2011), Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval (2009), 
Kuhnen and Tymula (2009)). 
 
FIGURE 5.—Notification when a subject is being watched. 
There is experimental evidence that subconscious cues of being watched by others may 
increase subjects’ cooperative behavior (see Bateson, Nettle and Roberts (2006), Burnham and 
Hare (2007), Haley and Fessler (2005)). In our experiment, participants knew that they were 
being watched by a subject present in the laboratory whose experiment ID was displayed on the 
left of the eye picture (see Figure 5). 
The monitoring technology introduced in the present paper allows for precise control over the 
supervision activities. In contrast with field studies (Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005), Falk 
and Ichino (2006), Mas and Moretti (2009)), we are able collect precise measures of peer 
pressure. For example, we can measure the exact amount of time subjects were being watched by 
others as well as the amount of time they spent watching others. It is also possible to identify the  
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watchers as well as the subjects who were being watched. Finally, the experimenter has access to 
the information that was displayed on the watchers’ screens at a given time. This information can 
be used in the analysis of peer monitoring effects.  
Another distinctive feature of our monitoring technology is that subjects could freely decide 
upon their monitoring strategy. Subjects could choose who to monitor and when to do so. This 
feature of the supervision technology will allow us to analyze subjects’ monitoring strategies. 
 
2.3. Treatments & Hypotheses 
We ran three different treatments (see Table 1). In the baseline treatment, subjects were 
rewarded on the work task according to their individual production. We refer to this case as 
Treatment I for individual incentives. In the second treatment, team incentives (Treatment T), the 
total production of the 10 subjects participating in the experiment was equally distributed among 
them. Our third experiment was the peer monitoring treatment (Treatment TP). Treatment TP 
was equivalent to Treatment T except that subjects could monitor their peers using the 
technology described in the previous section. The instructions for each treatment are available 
online.
30In order to establish predictions regarding the comparison of production levels and 
Internet usage across treatments, we rely on standard incentives theory (see Laffont and 
Martimort (2002) for a review). We voluntarily discard behavioral aspects such as social 
preferences (Fehr and Shmidt (1999)) in establishing those predictions. This is motivated by the 
fact that standard incentives theory leads to a unique set of predictions while introducing 
behavioral considerations may lead to multiple conjectures.  
                                            
30 http://sites.google.com/site/virtualorganization/instructions.  
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF THE TREATMENTS 
Treatment  Description  Number of sessions 
(subjects) 
Individual incentives (I) 
(Baseline) 
Subjects were rewarded on the work task 
according to their individual production.  7 (66) 
Team incentives (T)  Subjects were rewarded on the work task by 
obtaining 10% of the total production in the 
group session. 
6 (60) 
Peer monitoring (TP)  Subjects were rewarded according to team 




Regarding the comparison of individual and team incentives, we expect individual production 
to be greater under individual incentives while Internet usage is expected to be lower. This 
conjecture follows from the fact that, under team incentives, the cost of producing an additional 
table is fully incurred by the subject whereas its product is shared equally among team members 
(Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Holmström (1982)). The individual reward for summing up a 
table correctly is equal to 40¢ under individual incentives while it is equal to 4¢ (10%×40¢) 
under team incentives. In addition, given that incentives to work are stronger under individual 
incentives, the opportunity cost of leisure activities is higher in that case. These conjectures are 
summarized in the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (Individual incentives versus team incentives) 
i) Production is expected to be greater under individual incentives than under team incentives. 




Introducing behavioral considerations, we may also expect, in line with previous research, 
that team incentives will perform as well as individual incentives as a result of team spirit or 
team identity and interpersonal relationships among team members (Dumaine (1990, 1994), 
Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003), Hansen (1997), Ichniowski et al. (1996), Ichniowski, 
Shaw and Prennushi (1997), Kruse (1992), Manz and Sims (1993), van Dijk, Sonnemans and van 
Winden (2001)). However, none of these relevant features were introduced explicitly in our 
design. 
Regarding the comparison of the team incentives and the peer pressure treatments, standard 
incentives theory would predict no differences both in terms of production and Internet usage. In 
contrast with the work task, subjects had no monetary incentives to monitor others. Peer 
monitoring was a time consuming activity either in terms of work time or in terms of leisure 
time. As long as we ignore behavioral considerations, we should expect subjects to shy away 
from monitoring activities because they constituted a less attractive option than either working 
for cash or browsing the Internet. As a result, we should expect Treatment T and Treatment TP to 
be equivalent and lead to similar production levels as well as similar Internet usage. This 
conjecture is stated in the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (Peer monitoring) 
Production as well as Internet usage are expected to be similar for the team incentives and the 
peer pressure treatments. 
 
Considering behavioral aspects may lead to different predictions. For example, one may 
believe that people use monitoring as a tool to foster peer pressure and increase production as a  
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result (Carpenter, Bowles and Gintis (2009) and Kandel and Lazear (1992)). At the same time, 
one may expect monitoring activities to backfire generating distrust among workers. Indeed, 
recent research has emphasized this negative aspect of monitoring and put forward that trusting 
employees can lead to higher levels of effort than intensive supervision (Dickinson and Villeval 
(2008), Falk and Kosfeld (2006), Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2007a, 2007b), Frey (1993)).
31 We 
do not consider crowding-out of effort as our primary hypothesis because the disciplining effect 
of supervision has been found to be dominant in the absence of interpersonal relationships 
among workers as is the case in our experimental design (Dickinson and Villeval (2008), Frey 
(1993)). In addition, crowding-out effects are likely to be stronger in a principal-agent 
relationship or in any situation in which the monitor has some authority on the supervisee’s 
work. In our design, we consider a multi-agent monitoring structure in which there is no 
principal and no hierarchy since each subject has the same role. 
 
2.4. Procedures 
Our subject pool consisted of students from Chapman University. The experiments took place 
in December 2010 and February 2011. In total, 186 subjects participated in the experiment, 
divided in 17 sessions. We ran seven sessions for Treatment I, and six sessions for each of 
Treatments T and TP. Ten students participated in each session, except for two sessions of 8 
students that corresponded to Treatment I. The experiment was computerized using the software 
Virtual Organizations developed by CYDeveloper LLC. All of the interaction was anonymous. 
The instructions were displayed on subjects’ computer screen whenever all of them were 
seated. Subjects had exactly 20 minutes to read the instructions. A 20-minute timer was shown 
                                            
31 Crowding-out of intrinsic motivation has also been studied in the Psychology literature (Deci (1971, 1975), Deci, 
Koestner and Ryan (1999)). A theoretical account of crowding-out of intrinsic motivation has been provided by 
Bénabou and Tirole (2003).  
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on the laboratory screen. Three minutes before the end of the instructions period, a monitor 
entered into the room announcing the time remaining and handing out a printed copy of the 
summary of the instructions. None of the participants asked for extra time to read the 
instructions.
32 At the end of the 20-minute instruction round, the experimenter closed the 
instructions file from the server, and subjects typed their names to start the experiment. The 
interaction between the experimenter and the participants was negligible. We estimate that only 
5% of the subjects raised a question during the instructions period, and only very few subjects 
asked questions during the experiment.
33 
At the end of the experiment, all subjects were paid their earnings in cash, rounded up to the 
nearest quarter. Individual earnings at the end of the experiment are computed as the sum of the 
earnings in the 5 periods. Participants earned on average $26.30, including a $7.00 show-up fee. 
Participants in Treatments I,  T, and TP, earned on average $27.25, $24.45, and $27.10, 
respectively. Experimental sessions lasted on average two hours and ten minutes.  
 
3. RESULTS 
We start the results section by presenting a detailed analysis of the individual incentives 
treatment that will serve as a benchmark for our subsequent analyses. The team incentives 
treatment is analyzed in Section 3.2 and the peer pressure treatment is studied in Section 3.3. In 
Section 3.4, we assess the effect of each treatment on high-, middle-, and low- performers 
separately. 
 
                                            
32 At the time the monitor entered the room, most participants had already finished reading the instructions and were 
waiting the experiment to start. 
33 In the majority of sessions, no questions were asked during the experiment.  
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3.1. Individual Incentives 
3.1.1. The Work Task and the Clicking Task 
In this section we analyze the data that correspond to Treatment I (individual incentives) in 
which subjects were rewarded according to their individual production on the work task (Task 2). 
 
The Clicking Task 
In each period, subjects could earn up to $2.40 by clicking on the yellow box that appeared on 
their screen every 25 seconds. We summarize the earnings on the clicking task in Table 2. 
TABLE 2 
CLICKING TASK PERFORMANCE 
Earnings on the 
clicking task  % Subjects  Average performance of those 
subjects on the work task 
$2.40  53%  4.7 
[$2.30, $2.40)  35%  3.8 
[$2.10, $2.30)  9%  3.7 
[$0, $210)  3%  1.5 
 
We observe that a great majority of subjects (97%) were able to obtain at least $2.10 per 
period by clicking on the yellow box. Additionally, the median performance of subjects on the 
clicking task was $2.40 per period which is equivalent to clicking on the yellow box in each of 
its 240 appearences during the experiment. It also follows from Table 2 that most subjects can 
complete the work task while clicking on the yellow box whenever it appeared on the screen. 
This was the case becaue clicking on the boxes was practically effortless as each box moved 
slowly across the screen.
34 In fact, subjects who achieved the maximum level of earnings on the 
                                            
34 It took 25 seconds for each box to go across the screen. See video presentation of the software.  
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clicking task ($2.40) obtained significantly larger earnings on the work task than other subjects 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.05).
35 
 
The Work Task 
In addition to the effortless clicking task, subjects could undertake a real-effort task that 
consisted in adding numbers in a table. We present descriptive statistics regarding subjects’ 
production on the work task in Table 3. We define total production as the monetary amount 
generated by a subject’s answers on the work task divided by the reward for each correct answer 
(40¢). Total production is the number of correct answers that is equivalent to the monetary gains 
generated by a subject on the work task. It can be interpreted as the total number of correct tables 
completed by a given subject discounted by the number of incorrect answers. 
TABLE 3 
PERIOD EVOLUTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTION ON THE WORK TASK 
  Total Production 











Median 22.0  3.5 4.5 4.5 5.0 5.5 
Average 21.0  3.2 4.1 4.2 4.6 4.9 
Maximum 53.5  12.0 9.0 13.0 14.5 15.5 
Minimum 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Eight subjects (12%) did not produce anything on the work task explaining why the minimum 
level of production was equal to zero in each of the five periods. Nevertheless, these subjects, 
similarly to other participants, obtained earnings from clicking on the yellow boxes.
36 In Figure 
6, we show the histogram of individual production for subjects who produced at least one table 
                                            
35 It may be the case that subjects who are alert and attentive tend to perform well on both tasks. Notice that subjects 
with low ability on the work task may have had difficulties to complete both tasks at the same time as is suggested 
by cognitive neuroscience research (Conty et al. (2010)).  
36 By showing-up and clicking on the yellow boxes, subjects earn up to $19 for the experiment where $7 
corresponds to the show-up fee and $12 corresponds to the clicking task.    
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(88% of the sample). We do not reject the normality of the data whether we include (Jarque-Bera 
test, p = 0.8613), or exclude (p = 0.4689), workers producing nothing.
37  
 
FIGURE 6.—Histogram of total individual production on the work task (excluding non 
producers). 
In Figure 7, we display the evolution of subjects’ average and median production across the 
five periods. We observe a significant increase in both mean (28.1%) and median production 
(28.6%) in the second period (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.01). This increase may be due to 
learning effects as were identified in long mental arithmetic tasks (Charness and Campbell 
(1988)). The learning effect faded away with time as the increase in per period average 
production was significantly lower in subsequent periods.
38  
The summation task considered in the current experiment was significantly more complex 
than in the works of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) or Erikson, Poulsen and Villeval (2009) in 
which no learning effects were reported. In our task, subjects could develop strategies to sum up 
the 36 numbers in the table at a faster speed. For example, subjects could decide to sum the blue 
                                            
37 We obtain similar results using alternative normality tests like the D’Agostino test (p = 0.9357 and p = 0.3326, 
respectively). 
38 The percentage increase in period average production in periods 3, 4 and 5 was equal to 2.4%, 9.5% and 6.5%, 
respectively. The p-values for the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are all lower than 0.0001.  
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cells (that could be used to sum rows and columns) with arbitrary numbers and compute only the 
final sum of all the numbers in the table.  
 
FIGURE 7.—Median and average production across periods. 
We observe that average and median period production tended to stagnate in the third period 
before increasing again in the fourth and fifth periods. The evolution of production across 
periods stresses the fact that subjects were likely to reduce their effort mid-way through the 
experiment before finishing strongly. This interpretation was confirmed by running a regression 
of individual production on period dummies (see Table 4). We confirm that period production 
stagnated in Period 3 as is revealed by comparing the coefficient associated with Period 2 and 
Period 3 dummies (p = 0.8676). In addition, the increase in average period production between 
the second and third periods (2.4%) was significantly lower than the increase in period 
production between any other two consecutive periods.
39 We also show that production increased 
significantly more in Period 5 than in Periods 1, 2 or 3.
40 For example, period production is 
19.5% higher in Period 5 than in Period 2. In summary, the positive trend identified in the 
regression analysis (third column in the table) was mostly driven by an increase in production in 
the second period as well as an increase in production in the last period. 
                                            
39 The p-values for the corresponding Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are all lower than 0.005. 
40 The p-value for the coefficient tests comparing Period 2 (Period 3) and Period 5 is 0.0259 (0.0402).  
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TABLE 4 
TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INDIVIDUAL 
PRODUCTION 




Intercept  2.542*** (0.00)  2.395*** (0.00) 
Trend -  0.477***  (0.00) 
Period 2  1.207*** (0.01)  - 
Period 3  1.278*** (0.00)  - 
Period 4  1.711*** (0.00)  - 
Period 5  2.151*** (0.00)  - 
 Number of observations  
and Log likelihood 
n = 330 
Left censored 66 obs 
Log likelihood =  
-709.559, Prob > χ² = 0.000 
n = 330 
Left censored 66 obs 
Log likelihood =  
-711.102, Prob > χ² = 0.000 
 
The long duration of the real-effort task is likely to account for the stagnation of period 
production in the middle of the experiment. The duration of our task as well as its complexity 
were considerably higher than previous real-effort experiments that have used counting tasks 
(Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval (2009), Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)). It is then not surprising 
to identify signs of fatigue and boredom midway in the experiment. We summarize this unique 
feature of our work task as follows. 
 
OBSERVATION 1 (Work task production) 
Production on the work task gradually increased during the experiment. The most significant 
increase in period production occurred in Period 2 while the most negligible increase in period 
production occurred in Period 3 that corresponds to the middle of the experiment.  
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In addition to the work task and the clicking task, subjects also had access to real-leisure 
activities. Subjects could browse the Internet at any time during the experiment by switching to 
the Internet screen using the action menu. Browsing activities are analyzed in the following 
section. 
 
3.1.2. Working or Browsing the Internet 
In Figure 8, we represent the evolution of the average amount of time subjects spent browsing 
the Internet. 
 
FIGURE 8.—Average time (in %) subjects spent browsing the Internet and working on the task. 
We observe an increase in the use of Internet across periods as well as within periods. In the 
first two periods subjects spent 10.8% of their time on the Internet compared with an average of 
18.4% in the last three periods (see Table 5). In addition, subjects’ dedication to Internet 
browsing rose within periods starting at an average of 9.6% in the first fifteen minutes to reach 
18.9% in the last five minutes.
41,42  
                                            
41 The p-value for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is 0.0003. 
42 Notice that an additional exogenous break of one minute was instituted at the end of each period during which 
subjects could check their period earnings. Most subjects also used this minute to stretch.  
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TABLE 5 
DESCRIPTIVE STATICS OF INTERNET USE ACROSS PERIODS 
  Total   Period 1  Period 2  Period 3  Period 4  Period 5 
Average  15.4%  9.6%  12.1% 17.8% 19.2% 18.2% 
Standard 
deviation  30.2%  24.5% 26.4% 32.3% 33.9% 32.6% 
Proportion 
of subjects 
never on the 
Internet 





0.0%  6.1% 6.1% 9.1%  10.6%  9.1% 
 
It is interesting to observe that even under individual incentives, subjects were willing to 
dedicate some of their time to browsing the Internet (15.4%). Ours is the first experiment to 
report a precise measurement of on-the-job leisure activities and demonstrate their significance. 
Related experiments have stressed the relevance of off-the-job leisure activities that were 
assessed by analyzing quitting behaviors (Dickinson (1999), Falk and Huffman (2007)) but no 
studies have attempted to evaluate the importance of on-the-job leisure in a controlled 
environment. 
Our results show that, even in a laboratory environment usually prone to generating demand 
effects, subjects were ready to undertake leisure activities for which they were not paid by the 
experimenter. The introduction of Internet as an alternative activity as well as the introduction of 
a clicking task that gave rewards to subjects just for the sake of being at their workstation are 
crucial features of our environment. These features may have led subjects to consider leisure 
activities to be as salient as the work task. Yet, a majority of subjects never consulted the Internet 
(40.9%) focusing exclusively on undertaking the work task.  
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We report an increase in the use of Internet from Period 3 onwards with a peak in Period 4 
during which subjects spent almost 20% of their time on average on the Internet. This is 
consistent with Observation 1 according to which the smallest increase in period production 
occurred in Period 3. Using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, we confirm that the use of Internet was 
significantly larger in Period 3 than in Period 2 (p = 0.0359) while it was not significantly 
different between the first and second period (p = 0.5397).
43 We perform a regression analysis to 
assess the evolution of Internet usage across periods and confirm the increase in Internet usage 
from Period 3 onwards (see Table 6). 
TABLE 6 
TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INTERNET USAGE PER 
PERIOD 




Intercept  0.029 (0.95)  -0.366 (0.53) 
Trend -  0.661***  (0.00) 
Period 2  0.670 (0.25)  - 
Period 3  2.448*** (0.00)  - 
Period 4  2.766*** (0.00)  - 
Period 5  2.253*** (0.00)  - 
Number of observations 
and Log likelihood 
n = 330 
Right censored 8 obs 
Log likelihood = -921.256 
Prob > χ² = 0.001 
n = 330 
Right censored 8 obs 
Log likelihood = -926.493 
Prob > χ² = 0.000 
 
Given that browsing the Internet and working on the task were the two main activities 
competing for the attention of the subjects, we expect individual production to decrease with 
Internet usage. In line with this conjecture, we observe a stagnation point in period production in 
the middle of the experiment that coincides with a sharp increase in Internet usage. We confirm 
the negative relation between Internet usage and individual production by representing subjects’ 
                                            
43 We can also compare the average time each subject spent on the Internet in the first two periods with the time they 
spend on Internet in the last three periods. In this case the p-value is lower than 0.0001 for the Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test.  
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average production for increasing ranges of Internet usage (see Figure A.1 in the appendix). In 
addition, we report that the correlation between Internet usage and individual production was 
negative and significant regardless of the methodology used to compute correlation 
coefficients.
44 
One should not misinterpret the positive trend in both production and Internet usage as 
evidence of a positive relationship between work performance and leisure. Instead, one should 
recognize that the positive trend in production is mostly driven by learning effects that are 
unrelated to Internet usage.
45 
 
OBSERVATION 2 (Internet usage)  
i) The use of Internet started to increase significantly in the third period. 
ii) The use of Internet rose sharply in the last five minutes of each period. 
ii) The use of Internet was negatively correlated with individual production. 
 
In the next section, we compare individual incentives with team incentives in terms of 
production and Internet usage. The comparison between individual and team incentives 
constitutes an important step in our understanding of the role of incentives in the virtual 
organizations introduced in the present paper. 
 
                                            
44 The Pearson (Spearman) [Kendall] coefficient is equal to -0.5506 (-0.3783) [-0.2687] with p < 0.0001 (p = 
0.0017) [p = 0.0016]. 
45 In other words, we expect the positive trend in production to be steeper in the absence of Internet usage.  
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3.2. Team Incentives Versus Individual Incentives 
3.2.1. Individual Production Comparison 
We analyze individual production in the team incentives treatment similarly to the case of 
individual incentives. We provide descriptive statistics for individual production in Table 7. 
TABLE 7 















Median  14.5  1.3 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.3 
Average  14.0  2.3 2.9 2.8 3.0 3.3 
Maximum  33.8  6.7 8.6 8.4 7.5 7.5 
Minimum  0  0 0 0 0 0 
 
Similarly to individual incentives, period production steadily increased except for the third 
period. We confirm this finding in a regression analysis of individual production with respect to 
period dummies (see Table A.1 in the appendix). We observe that period production stagnated in 
the third period as is revealed by comparing the coefficient associated with Period 2 and Period 3 
dummies.
46 
We compare the time evolution of median and average production across treatments in Figure 
9. Average production per period was equal to 4.2 tables under individual incentives compared 
with 2.8 tables under team incentives. This corresponds to a 50% production gap between the 
individual incentives treatment and the team incentives treatment. Interestingly, this gap was 
observed for each of the five periods. 
                                            
46 These two coefficients are not significantly different (p = 0.8621). The coefficient of the Period 3 dummy is 
actually lower than the coefficient of the Period 2 dummy.  
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FIGURE 9.—Comparison across treatments of median and average production per period. 
In order to assess any statistical differences in individual production between the individual 
incentives treatment and the team incentives treatment we use a series of statistical tests that 
account for the specific nature of our data. More specifically, we use modifications of standard t-
tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests to the case of clustered data.
47 The clustered version of the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test was performed using Datta and Satten test (2005).
48 We aim at 
controlling for the fact that individual production in a given session may be affected by group 
production. This correction is especially relevant for the treatment with team incentives in which 
case the contributions of other group members may affect an individual’s motivation. At the end 
of each period, total group production was displayed on subjects’ screens. This may have led 
                                            
47 Despite that fact that we cannot reject normality of individual production for the two treatments taken separately, 
we provide non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests given that intra-cluster correlation may affect the validity of the 
normality tests (Weiss (1978)). Using Jarque-Bera tests we do not reject normality for individual production in 
Treatments I and T with the following p-values 0.8613 and 0.1846, respectively. We obtain similar results using 
alternative normality tests like the D’Agostino test. Using a modification of the exact Jarque Bera test that accounts 
for possible correlation in the data we reject normality for Treatments I and T in one (out of seven) and two (out of 
six) sessions, respectively (we used function jbTest in R). Evidence of non-normality is stronger for the use of 
Internet since applying the previous procedure, we reject normality for Treatments I and T in four and two sessions, 
respectively. In addition, pooling all sessions for each treatment we reject normality at a 5% significance level using 
the standard Jarque-Bera and D’Agostino test. 
48 The previous authors as well as Galbraith, Daniel and Vissel (2010) provided us with R codes for the test. The 
codes for the clustered t-test in R were provided by Frank Harrell who implemented the procedure used in Donner, 
Birkett and Buck (1981).  
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subjects to free ride whenever they observed an increase in group production as is the case in 
standard public good games (see Ledyard (1995) for a survey). In particular, we report that, 
under team incentives, an increase in group production in a given period decreased the 
production of high performers (above the average group production) while increasing the 
production of low performers (below the average group production) in the next period (see Table 
A.2 in the appendix). Group production in a given period did not affect individual production in 
subsequent periods in the case of individual incentives. 
The comparison of individual production across treatments stresses that organizations using 
individual incentives significantly outperformed those using team incentives regardless of the 
test we used (see Table 8).  
TABLE 8 
P-VALUES FOR STATISTICAL TESTS ASSESSING DIFFERENCES IN 
PRODUCTION BETWEEN THE TEAM INCENTIVES AND THE 



















0.0017*** 0.0088*** 0.0018*** 0.0033*** 0.0043*** 0.0100*** 
 
This finding also holds when comparing individual production across treatments for each of the 
five periods separately (see Table A.3 in the appendix). We confirm these differences across 
treatments using a regression analysis (see Table 9). We introduce the dummy variable 
Treatment I that takes value one if a given subject was involved in the individual incentives 
treatment and zero otherwise. We also include as dependent variable a proxy of subjects’ ability 
to sum up numbers (Ability factor). The ability factor is a dummy variable that takes a value of  
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one if subjects completed their first table correctly.
49 We show that the difference in individual 
production across treatments is robust to controlling for subjects’ abilities. In line with our 
interpretation of the ability factor, individuals with a high-ability factor significantly 
outperformed those with low-ability factors. 
TABLE 9 
TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR TOTAL 
INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTION (after the completion of the first table) 
  Coefficients (P-values) 
Intercept 3.551***  (0.06) 
Ability factor  2.124*** (0.00) 
Treatment I 1.584***  (0.00) 
Number of observations  
and Log likelihood 
n = 21 
Left censored 126 obs 
Log likelihood = -268.896, Prob > χ² = 
0.000 
 
We also illustrate the difference across treatments by comparing the empirical cumulative 
distribution of total individual production for team and individual incentives, respectively (see 
Figure 10). We reject the upper-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p = 0.0140) and confirm the 
first-order stochastic dominance of subjects’ production under individual incentives over 
subjects’ production under team incentives.
50 
                                            
49 In the treatment with individual incentives 44% of the participants completed their first table correctly compared 
to 45% in the treatment with team incentives. Notice that there exists a positive relationship between the ability 
factor and subjects’ final performance (see Table A.4 in the appendix) as is confirmed by the positive and significant 
coefficient associated with the ability factor in the regression analysis. 
50 This test has to be interpreted with caution given that our observations are not independently distributed. Indeed, 
observations are clustered by sessions of 10 subjects in the team incentives treatment.  
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FIGURE 10.—Comparison of empirical cumulative distribution of individual production across 
treatments. 
Finally, it is also the case that the proportion of subjects who did not produce anything was 
higher under team incentives (21.7%) compared with individual incentives (12.1%).
51 We 




RESULT 1 (Work task production: Individual versus team incentives).  
Total production was significantly greater in the individual incentives treatment than in the team 
incentives treatment. This result also holds when analyzing each period separately. 
 
This result is a necessary starting point in the experimental analysis of organizations as it 
identifies conditions under which individual incentives largely outperformed team incentives. 
                                            
51 Using a standard proportion test without correcting for possible clustering effects, the difference is not significant 
(p = 0.2315). 
52 Notice that we do not present a comparison of individual and team incentives regarding the performance on the 
clicking task since, independently of the treatment, subjects clicked on the yellow box as soon as it appeared on their 
screen (See Table A.5 in the appendix for more detail). 
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Organizations using individual incentives produced 52% more on average than those using 
individual incentives. To our knowledge, this is the first time this result is established in a 
controlled environment. This result is not surprising in the light of incentive theory (Hypothesis 
1) but constitutes an essential step in the empirical analysis of incentives given the limited 
evidence of free riding behaviors in teams (Dohmen and Falk (2011), Dumaine (1990, 1994), 
Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003), Hansen (1997), Ichniowski et al. (1996), Ichniowski, 
Shaw and Prennushi (1997), Kruse (1992), Manz and Sims (1993), van Dijk, Sonnemans and van 
Winden (2001)). Result 1 suggests that our experimental environment is well suited in order to 
identify incentives effects and could prove to be a privileged platform for an empirical 
assessment of the theory of incentives.  
Given the negative effect of Internet usage on individual production identified in the case of 
individual incentives, we expect the difference in individual production across treatments to be 
reflected in the use of Internet. The comparison of Internet usage across treatments is analyzed in 
more detail in the next section. 
 
3.2.2. Internet Usage Comparison 
We illustrate the sharp differences in Internet usage under individual and team incentives in 
Figure 11. Under team incentives subjects spent 28.5% of their time on average to browse the 
Internet while this percentage was only equal to 15.4% under individual incentives. Under team 
incentives, subjects dedicated an average of 19.1% of their time to Internet activities in the first 
two periods compared with 34.8% in the last three periods. The proportion of their time subjects 
dedicated to Internet usage under team incentives (28.5%) was remarkably similar to the figures 
published in the 2005 study by American Online and Salary.com according to which employees  
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spend about 26.1% of their time on activities unrelated to their work (Malachowski (2005)).
53,54 
Notice that in our environment, Internet usage was the only leisure activity available to workers. 
 
FIGURE 11.—Average time (in %) spent by subjects browsing the internet for individual and 
team incentives treatments. 
Similarly to the treatment with individual incentives, we find a positive trend in Internet usage 
(see Table A.6 in the appendix).
55 Internet usage increased significantly from Period 2 
onwards.
56 Similarly to the case of individual incentives, we find a sharp increase in Internet 
usage in the last five minutes of each period during which subjects spent 39% of their time on the 
web compared with 25% on average during the first fifteen minutes.
57  
We reject the hypothesis that Internet usage was identical for individual and team incentives 
(see Table A.7 in the appendix). Under team incentives, Internet usage was about twice higher 
                                            
53 Almost half of this time corresponds to Internet browsing. 
54 In addition, 85% of the subjects in the team incentives treatment decided to browse the Internet during the 
experiment. This figure is close to the 2005 study by Web@Work that reports that 93% of the workers admit to visit 
Internet web pages during their work day. 
55 Similarly to the case of individual incentives, we report a negative correlation between Internet usage and 
individual production since Pearson (Spearman) [Kendall] coefficients are equal to -0.6580 (-0.4754) [-0.6721] with 
p < 0.0001 in each case. 
56 Under individual incentives, the increase in Internet usage occurred one period later as the period dummies were 
significant from Period 3 onwards (see Table 6). 
57 The p-value for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is inferior to 0.0001.  
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than under individual incentives. In addition, Internet usage was significantly lower under 
individual incentives for each of the five periods analyzed separately (see Table A.8 in the 
appendix). In addition, we find that the positive trend was significantly more pronounced for 
Internet usage in the team incentives treatment compared with individual incentives (p = 0.0142). 
This implies that the treatment effect tended to become stronger over time as subjects’ fatigue 
and boredom was rising. This result follows from the regression in Table 10. 
TABLE 10 
TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INTERNET USE 
PER PERIOD 
 Coefficients  (P-values) 
Intercept 0.578  (0.41) 
Trend 1.178***  (0.00) 
Treatment 
(Dummy that takes value one if 
treatment is individual 
incentives) 
-1.223 (0.21) 
Trend×Treatment -0.510**  (0.03) 
Number of observations 
and Log likelihood 
 
n = 630 
Right censored 31 obs 
Log likelihood = -1882.731, Prob > χ² = 
0.000 
 
We summarize our findings regarding the effect of team incentives on Internet usage as 
follows. 
 
RESULT 2 (Internet usage: Individual versus team incentives).  
i) The use of Internet was significantly lower in the individual incentives treatment compared 
with team incentives. This result also holds when analyzing each period separately.  
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ii) The increase in Internet usage over time was significantly more pronounced in the team 
incentives treatment than in the individual incentives treatment. 
 
This finding emphasizes that, in an environment with a long and real-effort task in which 
fatigue was likely to arise, high-powered incentives were very effective in bringing down 
Internet usage. Indeed, subjects spent almost twice as long on Internet under team incentives than 
under individual incentives. In sum, shirking behaviors prevailed in the presence of low-powered 
incentives schemes. 
This result is fundamental as it shows that increasing the level of realism in the experimental 
environment leads to results that are consistent with incentives theory (see Holmström (1979), 
and Laffont and Martimort (2002) for a review). 
As a final step of our analysis, we introduce peer pressure in the virtual organization in order 
to assess whether the performance of organizations using team incentives can be enhanced by the 
use of real-time peer monitoring. 
 
3.3. Peer Pressure 
We start the analysis of peer monitoring by providing general statistics on watching activities. 
The analysis of production levels and Internet usage is completed in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, 
respectively. 
 
3.3.1. Watching Activities 
Subjects dedicated an average of 4.4% of their time to watching activities. They monitored 
others 5.7 times during the experiment for an average duration of 46 seconds per watching  
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episode. In addition, subjects were watched an average of 49.4 times for a total duration of 22 
minutes and 24 seconds. Interestingly, peer pressure did not fade away over time.
58 The amount 
of time subjects spent watching others did not decline over time as is confirmed by comparing 
watching activities across periods (see Table 11). We cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
amount of time subjects dedicated to watching activities was the same across periods.
59 
TABLE 11 
PERIOD EVOLUTION OF WATCHING ACTIVITY 
 
Amount of time 
spent watching in 
% of total time 
Period 1  Period 2  Period 3  Period 4  Period 5 




11.7%  31.7% 36.7% 31.7% 36.7% 31.7% 
 
The monitoring effort was shared among a large majority (88.3%) of subjects. The proportion 
of subjects who did not watch any other subject did not increase overtime and remained constant 
at a value close to one-third. Considering the experiment as a whole, only 11.7% (7 out of 60) of 
the subjects did not spend any time monitoring their peers. If free riding of monitoring activities 
had been prevalent, we would have observed a decrease in monitoring across periods as subjects 
would tend to rely on other workers to maintain the level of peer pressure. In our experiments, 
free riding on monitoring activities was limited because monitoring costs were shared among 
team members. Subjects who monitored others had to leave the work task screen affecting their 
productivity negatively. Given that subjects were paid according to team incentives any decline 
                                            
58 Watching activities were actually higher in the last period than in the previous four periods (see Table 11). This 
difference is not significant, however (p = 0.7100 for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test). 
59 We ran Wilcoxon signed-rank tests to compare the average amount of time subjects spent watching others in each 
period. To avoid clustering issues we analyze watching activities at the session level. We ran a total of ten tests and 
no p-values were below 0.20, except for the test comparing average watching times between Periods 2 and 5 (p = 
0.0940), giving weak support for the fact that subjects watched others more on average in Period 5 than in Period 2.  
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in production due to monitoring activities would affect all workers in the same magnitude. Our 
environment differs from the model presented by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) in which subjects 
who are paid according to their individual contribution would incur an individual cost for 
undertaking monitoring activities. Public good games with punishments also consider the case in 
which the cost for sanctioning other subjects is fully incurred by the individual punisher (Fehr 
and Gächter (2000)). 
Interestingly, it was unlikely for subjects to watch the same person at the same time. This 
occurred only in 16.7% of the watching episodes. It is then not surprising to report that all 
subjects were watched during the experiment for a minimum duration as high as 12 minutes (that 
is, 12% of the experiment time). In addition, the average proportion of subjects that were being 
watched in a given minute was equal to 44.8%, while subjects’ dedication to monitoring 
activities was limited to 4.4% of their time. This occurred because most watchers (94.2%) 
decided to monitor all subjects at the same time. As a result, the amount of time subjects were 
being watched during the experiment was similar across subjects.
60 In particular, subjects with 
different levels of performance were being watched for the same amount of time. It was not the 
case that either low- or high- performers were more likely to be watched by others. We test this 
conjecture by means of a regression analysis in which we introduce as dependent variables the 
amount of time subjects were watching others as well as the amount of time they were being 
watched by others (see Table A.9 in the appendix).
61 
Finally, it is interesting to note that subjects were as likely to be watched at the beginning, in 
the middle or at the end of each period (see Figure 12). More precisely, we analyze whether the 
                                            
60 In our experimental design, subjects could watch the other nine subjects at the same time by clicking on the 
monitor all button. In a related study (in progress), we focused on the specificities of the watching mechanism, we 
restrict the monitoring technology so that subjects can only watch a subset of coworkers at the same time. 
61 We use a 5-minute time frame to assess the impact of past performance on watching others or being watched by 
others. The relationship between watching activities and subjects’ performance ranks is provided in Section 3.4   
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pattern of watching activities within a period followed a random pattern by using a random order 
test.
62 To that end, we define an indicator variable that takes value one if a subject has been 
watching others in a given minute of a given period and takes value zero otherwise. Then, we 
analyze for each period of each of the six sessions (that is a total of 30 observations) whether the 
order of watching times followed a random order. We find that 25 out of 30 periods are 
characterized by random watching times. Therefore, we conclude that the pattern of watching 
times tended to follow a random order.We summarize our findings regarding watching activities 
as follows. 
 
RESULT 3 (Watching activities) 
i) Watching activities were limited to a small percentage (4.4%) of subjects’ available time. 
Nevertheless, all subjects were being watched during the experiment for an average of 22 
minutes and 24 seconds (that is, 22.4% of the duration of the experiment). 
ii) Watching activities did not fade away across periods. 
iii) The pattern of watching activities followed a random order.  
 
These results suggest that subjects were willing to exert peer pressure on others at any point 
during the experiment. If subjects had only been interested in feedback about their relative 
performance they may have used very short watching episodes concentrated toward the end of 
each period. Following this strategy, subjects could have gathered all the information necessary 
to assess their relative performance in a short amount of time. Instead, we find that subjects were 
being watched extensively during the whole experiment.  
                                            
62 We use the random order test in STATA and we consider that the pattern of watching in a given period is not 
random whenever the test rejects the null hypothesis at a 5% significance level (Swed and Eisenhart (1943)).  
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FIGURE 12.—Average proportion of subjects being watched in a given minute across periods 
and across sessions. 
 
3.3.2. Comparison of Individual Production Across Treatments 
Similarly to previous treatments, we find that individual production in the peer pressure 
treatment increased overtime with the exception of Period 3 as is illustrated in Figure 13. 
 
FIGURE 13.—Median and average production per period for all treatments.  
48 
We confirm the increase in production across periods by running a regression of individual 
production on period dummies and a trend (see Table A.10 in the appendix). We confirm that 
period production stagnated in Period 3 as is revealed by comparing the coefficient associated 
with Period 2 and Period 3 dummies (p = 0.9160). 
More importantly, we find that the peer pressure treatment is characterized by significantly 
higher levels of production than team incentives while no significant differences are found 
between peer pressure and individual incentives treatments (see statistical analysis in Table A.11 
in the appendix). Average (median) production was 47% (46%) larger in the peer pressure 
treatment than in the team incentives treatment. Additionally, average and median production 
under peer pressure (20.6 and 21, respectively) were remarkably close to the values obtained 
under individual incentives (21 and 22, respectively).  
We confirm the effect of peer pressure by running a Tobit regression in which we control for 
the ability of the subjects (see Table A.12 in the appendix). Notice that our results hold not only 
for total production but also for each period analyzed separately (see Table A.13 in the 
appendix). We conclude that peer effects did not vanish across periods since average (4.62) and 
median (5) production in the last period were significantly greater in the peer pressure treatment 
than in the team incentives treatment (3.28 and 3.25, respectively). Additionally, average 
production was 47.3% higher in the last two periods and 46.7% higher in the first two periods 
under the peer pressure treatment compared with the team incentives treatment.  
Finally, we represent the empirical cumulative distribution of individual production across 
treatments in the following graph (see Figure 14). We reject the upper-tailed Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test (p = 0.0380) and confirm the first-order stochastic dominance of individual  
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production in the peer pressure treatment compared with the team incentives treatment.
63 
However, we find no significant differences between the individual incentives and the peer 
pressure treatments (p = 0.5845). 
 
FIGURE 14.—Empirical cumulative distribution of individual production for all treatments. 
We summarize our findings in the statement of Result 4. 
 
RESULT 4 (Individual production: Peer pressure versus team and individual incentives) 
i) Individual production was significantly greater in the peer pressure treatment than in the team 
incentives treatment. Positive peer effects did not vanish with time. 
ii) Individual production was not significantly different between the peer pressure and the 
individual incentives treatments. This result also holds when analyzing each period separately. 
 
The introduction of peer monitoring in our experimental design appeared to be a very 
effective tool that permitted organizations using team incentives to reach efficient levels of 
                                            




64 This result is practically relevant for managers who usually possess limited 
information about individual contributions, and as a result, cannot rely on individual incentives 
schemes. 
To our knowledge, this is the first time this result is established empirically. Evidence of 
positive peer effects has been identified in field studies (Falk and Ichino (2006), Mas and Moretti 
(2009)), but none of these works have examined peer monitoring as a mechanism to resolve free 
riding in teams. It is also interesting to observe that we obtained strong peer monitoring effects in 
the absence of punishment devices or threats. It is indeed well known that punishments can be 
very effective in increasing contributions in public good games (Fehr and Gächter (2000), 
Masclet et al. (2003), Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2007)). Notice that in field studies such as the 
one designed by Mas and Moretti (2009), workers were not anonymous and could potentially 
face retaliation for non-cooperative behaviors. In our design, subjects were anonymous and this 
prevented any form of retaliation after the experiment. In contrast to field studies (Falk and 
Ichino (2006), Mas and Moretti (2009)) and public good games with threats (Masclet et al. 
(2003)), subjects were not allowed to communicate in our experiment. Finally, our peer 
monitoring technology did not rely on physical proximity and face to face interactions. Instead, 
subjects remained seated at their workstation while monitoring others. Supervisees simply 
received a notification on their screen that they were currently being watched by another subject. 
The fact that our monitoring technology was highly effective despite the absence of physical 
proximity and face to face communication is especially relevant given the growing interest for 
virtual monitoring devices within firms.
65 
                                            
64 We interpret the level of production obtained under individual incentives as the efficient level. 
65 A large number of programs such as Spectorsoft, Virtual Monitoring™, Employee Monitoring or Webwatcher are 
already available to monitor employees’ activities. An early account of computer-based monitoring systems was 
considered in Chalykoff and Kochan (1989).  
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Our result is related to the audience effects documented in the literature in social facilitation, 
starting with the seminal works of Zajonc (1965, 1980). The author puts forward that a subject’s 
performance on a given task is likely to be affected by the presence of others. In particular, 
Zajonc stresses that the presence of others affects performance positively for simple and well-
learnt tasks while affecting performance negatively for more complex tasks. Our result regarding 
the positive effect or peer pressure on individual production is consistent with Zajonc’s social 
facilitation theory if we consider summing numbers as a well-learnt task for a pool of 
undergraduate students. This finding is particularly striking if we take into account that monitors 
were not physically present at supervisees’ workstations in contrast with the context envisioned 
by Zajonc in his theory of audience effects. Our findings suggest that the presence effects 
highlighted by Zajonc are robust to the case of virtual monitoring.  
Despite the fact that our monitoring mechanism involves no physical proximity and no face to 
face interaction it constitutes a stronger mechanism than devices that simply rely on cues of 
being watched without implementing real supervision. Recent studies show that cues of being 
watched such as the display of the picture of eyes on the subject’s screen (Bateson, Nettle and 
Roberts (2006)) tends to increase cooperative behaviors in a context in which students were 
collecting money for drinks. Relatedly, Burnham and Hare (2007) find evidence of increased 
cooperation in a public good game experiment in which the picture of a robot’s face with 
prominent eyes was displayed on the screen. These findings suggest that not only being watched 
by others but cues of being watched may increase cooperative behavior. In our experimental 
design, we did not use cues as subjects knew that the eye picture only appeared when other 
subjects were currently watching them. Subjects who were being watched by others were  
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informed about the experiment ID of the watchers so as to eliminate speculations regarding the 
possible attempt of the experimenter to use deceptive strategies. 
Our result can also be interpreted in the light of audience effects reported by economists who 
stress that people may like to be perceived by others as altruistic and fair (Andreoni and 
Bernheim (2009), Levine (1998)). In our environment, subjects may have been willing to signal 
themselves as hard-working and cooperative to the person that was watching them. Relatedly, 
the power of peer pressure as was initially described by Kandel and Lazear (1992) is linked to 
the power of shame (Tadelis (2011)) by which workers may feel uncomfortable contributing less 
than the group average and decide to work harder as a result. The positive effect of peer 
monitoring is also consistent with early research in Sociology stressing that group incentives lead 
to low levels of shirking. Indeed, members of a work group tend to feel as if they shared a 
common fate, responding to peer pressure by increasing their contribution to the group because 
of the fear of disapproval from other members (Homans (1951), Roy (1953), Whyte (1955)).
66 
Result 4 is also in line with empirical evidence suggesting that mutual monitoring in work 
groups has been a decisive factor in the success of low-powered firm-wide incentives schemes as 
is described in the case of Continental Airlines (Knez and Simester (2001)). The authors mention 
shame as well as sanctioning as possible mechanisms inducing positive peer pressure. In this 
paper, we shed light on the relevance of peer pressure effects in a controlled environment in 
which subjects could not sanction their partners monetarily nor threat them verbally. 
Furthermore, we investigate the impact of watching episodes on individual production during 
the experiment. We perform a regression analysis in which we use as independent variables the 
amount of time subjects spent watching others as well as the amount of time subjects were being 
watched by others. This regression analysis allows us to disentangle the effect of watching others 
                                            
66 This position has been later criticized (e.g. Orr (2001)).  
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from the effect of being watched by others. In addition, we are able to study the dynamic 
structure of the effect of watching activities on individual production. 
In our analysis, we use a 5-minute time frame so as to assess the impact of watching activities 
on real-time production.
67 The independent variables related to watching activities are referred to 
as Watching and Being watched. These variables measure the amount of time (in seconds) that a 
subject spent watching others (Watching) and the amount of time (in seconds) a subject was 
watched (Being watched) by at least one subject in a given time span of five minutes. We 
introduce independent variables with lags so as to mitigate possible endogeneity issues.
68 We 
include a trend as independent variable so as to control for the steady increase of production 
across periods.
69 Finally, we control for subjects’ ability by adding the ability factor as 
independent variable. We provide the estimates for the regression analysis in Table 12.
70We 
conclude from our regression analysis that being watched by others affected individual 
production positively in the next five to ten minutes. The delay in the impact of watching 
activities can be accounted for the time subjects needed to produce a table (4 minutes and 3 
seconds on average) and increase individual production as a result. Furthermore, subjects who 
responded positively to peer monitoring by switching from the Internet screen to the work task 
                                            
67 Notice that an analysis with shorter time intervals (e.g. intervals of one minute) may not be adequate since 
subjects need on average 4 minutes and 3 seconds to complete a table. 
68 Endogeneity issues may arise if we introduce the current amount of time subjects spent watching others as well as 
the current amount of time they were being watched by others as independent variables. Indeed, one may expect that 
individual production could cause changes in watching behaviors. For example, subjects with low levels of 
production may feel ashamed (Kandel and Lazear (1992)) and decide to avoid consulting the performance of others.  
69 Similar results are obtained when controlling for beginning or end of period effects. For example, the nature of 
our results is unchanged when introducing in our regression analysis a dummy variable that takes value one if the 
five minute time span corresponds to the first (last) five minutes of the period.  
70 A number of other specifications have been considered such as including up to three lags in the independent 
variables or adding group production in the previous period as regressors. These specifications gave similar results. 
We also used dynamic panel data models with Arellano-Bond (1991) estimation technique. However, this estimation 
technique was not successful in fully eliminating residual autocorrelation as we may expect given the limited 
number of instrumental variables at our disposal.  
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may have needed an additional amount of time to bring their concentration back to the task (see 
Table 13 in Section 3.3.3).  
TABLE 12 
TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INDIVIDUAL 
PRODUCTION IN A 5-MINUTE TIME SPAN 
 Coefficients  (P-values) 
Intercept -0.8032***  (0.00) 
Being watched in t-1 0.0005  (0.39) 
Being watched in t-2  0.0017*** (0.01) 
Watching in t-1 -0.0014  (0.35) 
Watching in t-2  0.0012 (0.45) 
Ability factor  1.8408*** (0.00) 
Trend 0.0659***  (0.02) 
Number of observations 
and Log likelihood 
n = 1080 
398 left censored obs 
Log likelihood = -1324.595, Prob > χ² = 0.000 
 
Our results confirm that the significant difference in production levels between the team 
incentives treatment and the peer monitoring treatment can be accounted for by the pressure 
imposed by team partners on each other. Notice that we cannot discard the possibility that 
subjects reacted to the threat of peer monitoring rather than its effective implementation. 
However, we know that subjects were being watched extensively during the experiment (22.4% 
of their time) so that a significant part of the effect of peer monitoring is likely to be due to its 
actual implementation.      
Interestingly, watching others did not seem to affect the production of the watchers in the 
following minutes. This result stresses that the release of feedback about relative performance is 
not the driving force underlying the effect of peer monitoring on individual production. Instead, 
the effectiveness of peer monitoring seems to rely on effective social pressure exemplified by the 
positive reaction of subjects to the fact that they are being watched by others.   
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We summarize our findings in the next result. 
 
RESULT 5. (The effects of watching others and being watched by others) 
i) The more time subjects were being watched by others in a given time span of five minutes the 
more they were producing in the next five to ten minutes. 
 ii) Watching others in a given time span of five minutes did not affect one’s own production in 
the following minutes. 
 
It is important to stress that the analysis summarized in Result 5 was made possible by the 
unique features of our design. In particular, the introduction of real-time monitoring in a 
controlled environment allowed us to detail the mechanics of watching activities and shed light 
on peer effects as a result. To our knowledge this is the first time such a controlled analysis of the 
real-time effects of peer pressure is being undertaken. 
 
3.3.3. Comparison of Internet Usage Across Treatments 
Peer monitoring had a considerable impact on Internet usage. The average proportion of time 
subjects spent on Internet was 54% lower in the peer pressure treatment than in the team 
incentives treatment. We find significant differences in Internet usage between peer pressure and 
team incentives treatments whether considering total Internet usage (see Table A.14 in the 
appendix) or Internet usage per period (see Table A.15 in the appendix).  
Interestingly, the evolution of Internet usage was remarkably similar for the peer pressure and 
the individual incentives treatments (see Figure 15). Internet usage was actually less intensive 
under peer pressure (13.1%) compared to individual incentives (15.4%) although this difference  
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was not significant. We do not find any significant differences in Internet usage between peer 
pressure and individual incentives treatments whether considering total Internet usage (see Table 
A.14 in the appendix) or Internet usage per period (see Table A.15 in the appendix). 
 
FIGURE 15.—Time evolution of average Internet usage (in %) for all treatments. 
Similarly to previous treatments, we identify a positive trend in Internet usage (see Table A.16 
and Table A.17 in the appendix).
71  The proportion of time subjects dedicated to Internet in the 
first two periods was as low as 7.7% on average compared to 16.7% in the last three periods. We 
also report a sharp increase in Internet browsing in the last five minutes during which subjects 
spent 18.6% of their time on the web compared to 10.3% on average during the first fifteen 
minutes.
72 
We analyze whether peer watching affects subjects’ use of the Internet during the experiment. 
In particular, we assess whether being watched in a given 5-minute time span led subjects to 
switch to the work task screen in the following five minutes.
73 In Table 13, we display the results 
                                            
71 In line with previous treatments, we also report a negative correlation between Internet usage and individual 
production since Pearson (Spearman) [Kendall] coefficients are equal to -0.5685 (-0.6443) [-0.4501] with p < 
0.0001 in each case. 
72 The p-value for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is inferior to 0.0001. 
73 Similar results are obtained using a minute analysis.  
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of a Logistic regression where the variable Work task is a dummy variable that takes value one if 
the corresponding subject was on the Work task screen in a given 5-minute time span and zero 
otherwise. We use dummy variables for each time frame of five minutes so as to control for the 
rising use of Internet within a given period. We find that, the more time a subject was being 
watched in a given 5-minute time span the more likely he or she was to be on the Work task 
screen in the following five minutes. This is the case since the coefficient associated with Being 
watched is positive and significant. 
TABLE 13 
LOGISTIC REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR PER 
MINUTE ACTIVITES 
Dependent variable:  
Work task in t  Coefficients (P-values) 
Intercept  5.702 *** (0.00) 
Being watched in t-1 0.008***  (0.00) 
Individual production in t-1  0.769*** (0.00) 
Trend (Period)  -0.601*** (0.00) 
Dummy Minute 6 to 10  0.148 (0.78) 
Dummy Minute 11 to 15  -0.893* (0.06) 
Dummy Minute 16 to 20  -1.191** (0.01) 
Number of observations 
and Log likelihood 
n = 1140 
-172.568, Prob > χ² = 0.000 
 
The introduction of peer monitoring in our experimental design brings down Internet usage. 
This result stresses that organizations can limit shirking behaviors by using peer monitoring. This 
is an important finding given the growing concern for cyber-slacking (Malachowski (2005), 
Young (2006)). Our analysis suggests that, in contrast to other supervision mechanisms, peer 
monitoring does not induce crowding-out of effort. Evidence of the negative impact of 
supervision policies on employees’ effort have been encountered in the experimental literature 
(Dickinson and Villeval (2008), Falk and Kosfeld (2006), Frey (1993)). These authors stress that 
supervision policies may be perceived as a signal of distrust and, as a result, undermine workers’  
58 
effort. Frey (1993) as well as Dickinson and Villeval (2008) put forward that the crowding-out 
effect that results from monitoring activities dominates its disciplining effect when there exist 
interpersonal relationships between managers and employees whereas the opposite tends to be 
true in the absence of such relationships. In that respect, our findings are consistent with the 
works of Frey (1993) and Dickinson and Villeval (2008) since our experimental design is 
characterized by the absence of interpersonal relationships among workers. 
Furthermore, we believe that crowding-out effects are likely to be stronger in a principal-agent 
relationship or in any organizational structure in which the monitor has some authority over the 
supervisee’s work. By contrast, our design is characterized by a multi-agent monitoring structure 
in which there is no principal and no hierarchy since each subject has the same role. In that 
context, we show that the disciplining effect of peer monitoring dominates the crowding-out 
effect.  
We summarize our findings as follows. 
 
RESULT 6 (Internet usage: Peer pressure versus team and individual incentives) 
i) The use of Internet was significantly lower in the peer pressure treatment than in the team 
incentives treatment. Internet usage was not significantly different between the peer pressure and 
the individual incentives treatments. 
ii) Subjects were more likely to switch from Internet to the work task if they had been watched by 
others in the previous minute. 
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In the next section, we provide a comparison of the three treatments by analyzing high-, 
middle- and low- performers separately. Our aim is to assess whether treatment effects are 
confined to subjects with certain levels of performance. 
 
3.4 Analysis by Performance Ranks 
We first compare treatments in terms of production and Internet usage across three categories 
of subjects’ relative standings. We classify subjects according to their relative performance using 
the concept of ranks. More specifically, we pool the top three performers of each experimental 
session in the high-rank category and the bottom three performers in the low-rank category. 
Subjects that do not belong to either one of these two categories are grouped together and referred 
to as middle ranks.
74,75 Unsurprisingly, the average performance of subjects is significantly 
different across rank categories. For example, the performance of high-rank subjects in 
Treatments I, T and TP are on average 66%, 112%, and 69% higher than the performance of 
middle-rank subjects, respectively (see Figure 16).
76 
We observe that the individual incentives treatment significantly outperformed the team 
incentives treatment for each rank category. Under individual incentives, median (average) 
production for high and middle ranks was 21% and 65% (27% and 63%) greater than under team 
incentives. Median production for low rank producers was equal to zero under individual 
                                            
74 Notice that all sessions involved groups of ten subjects except two sessions with 8 subjects in the individual 
incentives treatment. For these two sessions, we have only two low- and two high- rank subjects instead of three and 
three, respectively. 
75 The pooling of subjects in rank categories is motivated by the fact that analyzing each rank separately would leave 
us with only one observation per experimental session. For our statistical analysis we prefer to consider only three 
categories of ranks: low, middle and high. Notice that we obtain similar results with different definitions of rank 
categories. For example, the qualitative nature of our results hold when grouping the top two performers and the 
bottom two performers in the high-rank and in the low-rank categories, respectively. 
76 Additionally, rank categories are closely related to the ability factor. The proportion of high-ability-factor subjects 
is significantly different across rank categories since p = 0.0149 for the proportion test comparing low and middle 
ranks for all treatments and p = 0.0041 for the test comparing middle and low ranks for all treatments.  
60 
incentives while it was equal to 10 under team incentives.
77 In addition, the peer pressure 
treatment outperformed the team incentives treatment for both middle and high ranks by 28% and 
57% (27% and 63%) in median (average) terms.
78 However, peer pressure and team incentives 
led to similarly low levels of performance for low-rank subjects with median production levels as 
low as 0.5 and 0.0, respectively.
79 Using both clustered t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests we 
confirm that, for low-rank subjects, production was significantly greater under individual 
incentives than under peer pressure.
80  
 
FIGURE 16.—Median and average total production per ranks and across treatments. 
Interestingly, a closer look at low-rank subjects in the peer pressure treatment reveals that, 
despite producing less than in the individual incentives treatment, their use of Internet was not 
significantly different between the two treatments (see Figure 17).
81 At the same time, low-rank 
                                            
77 When comparing individual incentives with team incentives for high ranks, we report that p = 0.0072 and p= 
0.0409 for the clustered t-test and the clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum test, respectively. For middle ranks, the 
corresponding p-values are p = 0.0011 and p= 0.0316, while for low ranks we obtain p = 0.0001 and p= 0.0098. 
78 When comparing peer pressure with team incentives for high ranks, we report that p = 0.0072 and p= 0.0409 for 
the clustered t-test and the clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum test, respectively. For middle ranks, the corresponding p-
values are p = 0.0011 and p= 0.0316. 
79 In that case, p = 0.3011 and p= 0.3008 for the clustered t-test and the clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum test, 
respectively. 
80 We report that p = 0.0032 and p= 0.0561 for the clustered t-test and the clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum test, 
respectively. 
81 p = 0.8226 and p = 0.7242 for the clustered t-test and the clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum test, respectively.  
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subjects in both the individual incentives and the peer pressure treatments browsed the Internet 




FIGURE 17.—Average use of Internet in % of the total time (on the left panel) across ranks and 
treatments and average watching time and Internet use by ranks (on the right panel). 
Furthermore, it is interesting to observe that, even though low-rank subjects performed 
significantly worse in the peer pressure treatment compared with the individual incentives 
treatment, they did not differ in the total number of tables they completed. In Treatment TP, low-
rank subjects completed an average of 18.8 tables compared with 18.3 under individual 
incentives. However, the percentage of incorrect answers was significantly greater in the peer 
pressure treatment (68%) compared with individual incentives (56%). The percentage of errors in 
the peer pressure treatment was similar to the case of team incentives (72%).
83,84 Nonetheless, the 
                                            
82 For the comparison of the individual incentives (peer pressure) treatment with the team incentives treatment, we 
obtain that p = 0.0062 and p= 0.0301 (p = 0.0225 and p= 0.1157) for the clustered t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum 
test, respectively. 
83 The p-values for the corresponding clustered t-tests are equal to 0.0116 and 0.2130.  
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total number of tables completed was significantly greater in the peer pressure treatment (18.8) 
compared with the team incentives treatment (13.4).
85 In summary, subjects who were involved in 
the peer pressure treatment tried more on the work task than subjects who did not face peer 
pressure, but their level of accuracy was not significantly increased.
86 These findings are 
consistent with Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval (2009) who show that providing continuous 
feedback about others’ performance to low performers decreased their level of accuracy in a 
summation task similar to the one used in the current experiment.
87 
Notice that the poor performance of low-rank subjects in the peer pressure treatment is not 
driven by differences in watching activities. Indeed, subjects were being monitored for the same 
amount of time independently of their rank. In particular, high-rank subjects were being watched 
for 22.3 minutes on average while middle-rank subjects and low-rank subjects were being 
watched for 22.8 and 21.9 minutes, respectively.
88 It is also the case that subjects belonging to 
different rank categories do not differ regarding the average amount of time they spent watching 
others. Low-, middle- and high- rank subjects spent on average 3.8, 3.7 and 5.8 minutes watching 
others. These differences are not significant.
89 
                                                                                                                                             
84 It is also the case for each of the three treatments that high-rank (middle-rank) subjects are characterized by a 
significantly lower percentage of errors and a significantly greater number of total answers compared to middle-rank 
(low-rank) subjects. We do not report these results because of space constraints. 
85 The p-value for the corresponding one-sided clustered t-test is equal to 0.0325. 
86 Notice that a similar result is obtained if we pool subjects according to their ability factor instead of their rank 
category. For low-ability subjects, the percentage of incorrect answers under individual incentives is equal to 44.3% 
while it is equal to 56.2% and 60.9% for Treatments TP and T, respectively. 
87 Bandiera, Larcinese and Rasul (2010) do not report any positive effect of individual feedback on students’ 
performance in the case of low performers. In a related study, Azmat and Iriberri (2010) identify positive effects of 
feedback on relative performance for the whole range of ability levels. Sacerdote (2001), Tran and Zeckhauser 
(2009) and Zimmerman (2003) also report positive peer effects. 
88 These differences are not significant. We use clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum test and obtain p = 0.5360 when 
comparing low and middle ranks, and p = 0.3709 when comparing low and high ranks. The p-value for the 
comparison of middle and high ranks was equal to 0.5819. Similar results are obtained using clustered t-tests. 
89 Notice that median watching times are equal to 3.8, 3.7 and 3.4, respectively. Using a clustered t-test (clustered 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test) we obtain p = 0.7586 (p = 0.2441) when comparing low and middle ranks while p = 0.1520 
(p = 0.4758) when comparing low and high ranks, and p = 0.1860 (p = 0.6838) when comparing middle and high 
ranks.  
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In line with recent research in cognitive neurosciences (Conty et al. (2010)), one may think 
that low performers may be particularly sensitive to the distractive effect of the notification that 
appeared on their screen whenever they were being watched. Indeed, the display of the eye 
picture was likely to employ subjects’ cognitive resources and may, as a result, have worked as a 
powerful distracter for subjects characterized by low levels of ability on the task. 
 
FIGURE 18.—Average number of correct and incorrect answers by ranks. 
The negative effect of peer monitoring on low-rank subjects is also related to Zajonc’s social 
facilitation theory (1965, 1980). According to Zajonc’s theory, subjects become more active 
when they are being watched by others. As a result, subjects facing a difficult (easy) task are 
expected to provide an increased number of incorrect (correct) answers as a result of peer 
monitoring.Therefore, low-rank subjects who were likely to perceive the task as being difficult 
provided significantly more incorrect answers in the peer pressure treatment (13.4) than in the 
team incentives treatment (9.2).
90 In sum, low-rank subjects were more active when they were 
being watched by others but this increased level of alertness fostered inaccuracies. To the 
contrary and in line with Zajonc’s theory, high- and middle rank subjects who were likely to 
                                            
90 The (one-sided) p-values are equal to 0.0588 and 0.0883 for the clustered t-test and the clustered Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, respectively. Low-rank subjects were likely to perceive the task that consists in summing 36 numbers as 
difficult since a majority of them had low levels of ability on the task.   
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perceive the task as easy, completed more tables and achieved a greater level of accuracy in the 
peer pressure treatment than in the team incentives treatment (see Figure 18).
91  
We confirm this interpretation of our findings by separately analyzing the impact of watching 
activities on individual production for low-rank and middle to high rank subjects.
92 We provide 
the regression estimates in the appendix (Table A.18). In line with social facilitation theory, we 
observe that being watched by others affected individual production negatively for subjects who 
were low performers while the opposite was true for middle to high performers. 
 
RESULT 7 (Peer pressure versus team incentives and individual incentives across ranks)  
i) (High and Middle Rank: Production) Production was significantly greater in the peer pressure 
treatment than in the team incentives treatment for high- and middle- ranks. We found no 
differences in individual production between the peer pressure treatment and the individual 
incentives treatment. 
ii) (High and Middle Rank: Internet) Internet usage was significantly lower in the peer pressure 
treatment than in the team incentives treatment for high- and middle- rank categories. We found 
no differences in Internet usage between the peer pressure treatment and the individual 
incentives treatment. 
ii) (Low Rank: Production) Production was not significantly different in the peer pressure 
treatment than in the team incentives treatment. However, production was significantly lower in 
                                            
91 Comparing the number of tables completed across treatments, we obtain (one-sided) p-values equal to 0.0031 and 
0.0198 for the clustered t-test and the clustered Wilcoxon rank-sum test, respectively. Comparing inaccuracy rates, 
we obtain (one-sided) p-values equal to 0.0439 and 0.0671 for the clustered t-test and the clustered Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, respectively. 
 
92 We completed this regression analysis in Section 3.3.2 (Table 12) for the whole sample of subjects.  
65 
the peer pressure treatment as well as in the team incentives treatment than in the individual 
incentives treatment. 
iii) (Low Rank: Internet) Internet usage was significantly lower in the peer pressure treatment 
than in the team incentives treatment. However, we found no differences in Internet usage 
between the peer pressure treatment and the individual incentives treatment. 
v) The more time low-rank subjects were being watched by others in a given time span the less 




The primary objective of this research endeavor was to propose an empirical methodology for 
the analysis of organizational issues in the laboratory. To that end, we incorporated several 
crucial features of existing firms in a virtual organization. We allowed subjects to allocate their 
time between a real-effort task that created value for the organization and a real-leisure activity. 
We considered the most decentralized form of organizations in which no hierarchies existed and 
all subjects had the same role. This represented a natural starting point that guided us in our quest 
to identify the elements that lead to organizational success.  
As a first step, we compared organizations using team and individual incentives in order to 
assess the relevance of incentives effects in our virtual organizations. We found that individual 
incentives led to levels of production that were 52% higher and levels of Internet usage that were 
46% lower than under team incentives. These findings confirmed that implementing high-
powered incentives schemes is an important factor of organizational success consistently with 
theoretical research (Holmström (1979), see Laffont and Martimort (2002) for a review).  
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Nevertheless, most organizations are limited in their use of individual incentives as a result of 
asymmetric information (Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Holmström (1982)) and may have to 
resort to alternative mechanisms to achieve high production levels. 
We studied peer monitoring as an example of mechanism that may allow organizations to 
recover the efficiency loss provoked by the use of team incentives. We found that using peer 
monitoring in combination with team incentives allowed organizations to reach production levels 
that were as high as in the case of individual incentives. The use of peer monitoring reduced 
shirking behaviors. In particular, Internet usage was 54% lower for organizations relying on peer 
monitoring compared with those using team incentives alone. In contrast to public good games 
with punishments, both effort and efficiency were increased by the use of peer monitoring. To our 
knowledge, ours is the first controlled experiment showing that peer monitoring can offset the 
loss in efficiency resulting from the use of low-powered incentives schemes. Peer monitoring was 
particularly effective because subjects spent a limited amount of time watching others (4.4% of 
their time) while sharing the monitoring burden so that all subjects were being watched at least 
once during the experiment. It is as if people possessed natural skills for peer monitoring and 
understood both its positive effect on productivity as well as the negative consequences of its 
intensive use. However, the positive impact of peer pressure on productivity did not apply to low 
performers even though peer pressure pushed them to work harder and reduce their Internet 
usage. The increase in effort did not translate into an increase in productivity as low performers 
became less accurate as a result of peer monitoring. 
In summary, peer-pressure was a very effective mechanism by which organizations using team 
incentives achieved production levels that were remarkably close to those of organizations relying 
on individual incentives schemes. This is good news for most organizations that cannot rely on  
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precise measures of individual contributions. Peer monitoring is traditionally seen as a decisive 
advantage of organizations with respect to markets as its effectiveness usually relies on face to 
face and repeated interactions among parties that are inherent to the organizational environment 
(Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2005), Falk and Ichino (2006), Mas and Moretti (2009)). 
However, the implementation of virtual monitoring devices of the type used in the present paper 
may mitigate this comparative advantage of organizations as it may raise the effectiveness of peer 
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FIGURE A.1.—Average production by range of Internet usage. 
 
TABLE A.1 
TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTION 
PER PERIOD (TEAM INCENTIVES TREATMENT) 
  Coefficients (P-values)  Coefficients (P-values) 
Intercept  1.101** (0.02)  1.044** (0.03) 
Trend -  0.336***  (0.00) 
Period 2  1.003** (0.03)  - 
Period 3  0.924** (0.04)  - 
Period 4  1.211*** (0.00)  - 
Period 5  1.592*** (0.00)  - 
Number of observations 
and Log likelihood 
n = 300 
Left censored 101 obs 
-557.425, Prob > χ² = 0.000 
n = 300 
Left censored 101 obs 





TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTION PER 
PERIOD 




Intercept  -0.983 (0.37)  2.507** (0.02) 
Trend  0.147 (0.37)  0.335** (0.02) 
Group production in (t-1)  0.597* (0.10)  -0.006 (0.98) 
Group production in (t-1)  
× Dummy greater than group average in 
(t-1)
93 
-0.908** (0.03)  -0.030 (0.93) 
Dummy greater than group average in (t-
1)  4.675*** (0.00)  0.805 (0.55) 
Number of observations 
and Log likelihood 
n = 300 
Left censored 76 obs 
-451.414, Prob > χ² = 
0.000 
n = 300 
Left censored 76 obs 




P-VALUES FOR CLUSTERED T-TESTS (CLUSTERED 
WILCOXON RANK-SUM TESTS) ASSESSING DIFFERENCES 
IN PERIOD PRODUCTION BETWEEN THE TEAM 
INCENTIVES AND THE INDIVIDUAL INCENTIVES 
TREATMENT 












We identify the top three performers as high ranks and the bottom three performers as low 
ranks. Subjects that do not belong to either one of these two categories are grouped together and 
referred to as middle ranks (rank 4, 5, 6 and 7). In the table below, we show that the percentage 
of high-ability subjects increases with rank category. 
                                            
93 This dummy variable takes a value of one if a given subject produces strictly more than the average of the other 




ABILITY FACTOR BY SUBJECTS’ 
PERFORMANCE RANKS FOR ALL TREATMENTS 
Ranks  % subjects with high 
ability factor 
High  72.7% 
Middle  50.0% 
Low  23.6% 
 
TABLE A.5 
CLICKING TASK PERFORMANCE AND TIMING ACROSS TREATMENTS 
Clicking task  Treatment (I)  Treatment (T)  Treatment (TP) 
Success rate 
(Average proportion of the 240 
yellow boxes subjects had clicked 
before they disappear from the 
screen) 
98%  97%  99% 
P-value clustered Wilcoxon rank-
sum test (clustered t-test) 
Treatment I 
vs. Treatment T 
p = 0.616 (0.397) 
Treatment T 
vs. Treatment TP 
p = 0.784 (0.223) 
Treatment TP 
vs. Treatment I 





TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INTERNET USAGE PER 
PERIOD 




Intercept  0.368 (0.65)  0.730 (0.35) 
Trend 1.196***  (0.00)  - 
Period 2  -  2.463*** (0.00) 
Period 3  -  4.125*** (0.00) 
Period 4  -  4.799*** (0.00) 
Period 5  -  4.786*** (0.00) 
Number of observations  
and Log likelihood  
n = 300 
Right censored 23 obs 
-933.539, Prob > χ² = 0.000 
n = 300 
Right censored 23 obs 




P-VALUES FOR STATISTICAL TESTS ASSESSING DIFFERENCES IN 
INTERNET USAGE BETWEEN THE TEAM INCENTIVES AND THE 




















0.0007*** 0.0075*** 0.0001*** 0.0000***  0.0123**  0.0221** 
 
                                            




P-VALUES FOR CLUSTERED T-TESTS (CLUSTERED 
WILCOXON RANK-SUM TESTS) ASSESSING 
DIFFERENCES IN INTERNET USAGE PER PERIOD 
BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND TEAM INCENTIVES 
TREATMENTS 












We run the following regressions so as to assess the impact of subjects’ previous performance 
on watching others and being watched by others. We use Tobit regressions with random effects. 
We also use dummy variables for each time frame of five minutes so as to control for different 
levels of production within a given period. The dependent variables correspond either to the 
amount of time (in seconds) a subject was watching others in a given time span of five minutes or 
the amount of time (in seconds) a subject had been watched by others in the same time span. 
 
TABLE A.9 
TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR WATCHING ACTIVITIES AS A 
FUNCTION OF PAST PRODUCTION 
 
Dependent variable: 
Time watching in t 
Coefficients (P-values) 
Dependent variable: 
Time being watched in t 
Coefficients (P-values) 
Intercept  -76.437***  (0.00)  -2.590 (0.70) 
Trend (periods)  0.358 (0.85)  5.401*** (0.00) 
Individual production in t-1  -0.091 (0.18)  0.016 (0.71) 
Minute 6 to 10  19.429** (0.02)  37.638*** (0.00) 
Minute 11 to 15     20.531** (0.01)  43.134*** (0.00) 
Minute 16 to 20  73.602*** (0.00)  117.485*** (0.00) 
Number of observations 
and Log likelihood 
n = 1140 
Left censored 808  
(3 right censored) 
-2184.538, Prob > χ² = 0.000 
n = 1140 
Left censored 159  
(27 right censored) 





TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTION 
PER PERIOD IN THE PEER PRESSURE TREATMENT 




Intercept  2.826*** (0.00)  2.609*** (0.00) 
Trend -  0.356***  (0.00) 
Period 2  0.675 (0.12)  - 
Period 3  0.720* (0.09)  - 
Period 4  1.433*** (0.00)  - 
Period 5  1.405*** (0.00)  - 
Number of observations 
and Log likelihood 
n = 300 
Left censored 70 obs 
-617.9817, Prob > χ² = 0.0038 
n = 300 
Left censored 70 obs 




P-VALUES FOR STATISTICAL TESTS ASSESSING DIFFERENCES IN INDIVIDUAL 
PRODUCTION ACROSS TREATMENTS 




























0.8728 0.7310 0.8660 0.7654 0.8403 0.6282 
 
                                            
95 This was performed using Datta and Satten test (2005). The previous authors as well as Galbraith, Daniel and 




TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTION 
PER PERIOD (after the completion of the first table) AS A FUNCTION OF ABILITY 
AND TREATMENT DUMMY THAT TAKES VALUE ONE FOR TREATMENT TP 
  Treatments TP and T 
Coefficients (P-values) 
Treatments TP and I 
Coefficients (P-values) 
Intercept  4.301*** (0.00)  5.413 (0.00) 
Ability Factor  3.484*** (0.00)  2.489*** (0.00) 
Treatment TP  1.124*** (0.01)  -0.375 (0.44) 
Number of observations 
and Log likelihood 
n = 120 
Left censored 22 obs 
-246.514, Prob > χ² = 0.00 
n = 126 
Left censored 17 obs 
-282.771, Prob > χ² = 0.00 
 
TABLE A.13 
P-VALUES FOR CLUSTERED T-TESTS (CLUSTERED WILCOXON 
RANK-SUM TESTS) ASSESSING DIFFERENCES IN INDIVIDUAL 
PRODUCTION PER PERIOD ACROSS TREATMENTS 
  Period 1  Period 2  Period 3  Period 4  Period 5 




























P-VALUES FOR STATISTICAL TESTS ASSESSING DIFFERENCES IN INTERNET 
USAGE ACROSS TREATMENTS 



























0.7276 0.7543 0.7253 0.8280 0.6782 0.5338 
 
TABLE A.15 
P-VALUES FOR CLUSTERED T-TESTS (CLUSTERED WILCOXON RANK-SUM TESTS) 
ASSESSING DIFFERENCES IN INTERNET USAGE PER PERIOD ACROSS 
TREATMENTS 
  Period 1  Period 2  Period 3  Period 4  Period 5 



























TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INTERNET USAGE PER 
PERIOD IN THE PEER PRESSURE TREATMENT 




Intercept  1.191* (0.06)  0.657 (0.290) 
Trend -  0.563***  (0.00) 
Period 2  0.722 (0.17)  - 
Period 3  2.188*** (0.00)  - 
Period 4  2.245*** (0.00)  - 
Period 5  2.019*** (0.00)  - 
Number of observations 
and Log likelihood 
n = 300 
Right censored 2 obs 
-813.4216, Prob > χ² = 0.000 
n = 300 
Right censored 2 obs 




TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR 
INTERNET USAGE PER PERIOD IN THE TEAM 
INCENTIVES AND THE PEER PRESSURE 
TREATMENTS 
 Coefficients  (P-values) 
Intercept 0.533  (0.438) 
Trend 1.176***  (0.00) 
Trend×Treatment -0.153***  (0.00) 
Treatment 
(Takes value one if peer 
pressure and zero if team 
incentives) 
0.011 (0.97) 
Number of observations 
and Log likelihood 
n = 600 
Right censored 25 obs 




TOBIT REGRESSION WITH RANDOM EFFECTS FOR INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTION 
ACROSS RANK CATEGORIES IN A 5-MINUTE TIME SPAN 
  Low-rank subjects 
Coefficients (P-values) 
Middle- and high- rank subjects 
Coefficients (P-values) 
Intercept  -0.2507 (0.19)  0.5888*** (0.01) 
Being watched in t-1  -0.0022*** (0.00)  0.0009 (0.22) 
Being watched in t-2  0.0007 (0.42)  0.0020*** (0.00) 
Watching in t-1  0.0002 (0.88)  0.0005 (0.78) 
Watching in t-2  -0.0014 (0.36)  0.0009 (0.61) 
Ability factor  0.3800* (0.10)  0.4444* (0.05) 
Trend (Period)  0.0643* (0.09)    0.077** (0.02) 
Number of observations 
and Log likelihood 
N = 324 
112 left censored obs 
-146.826, Prob > χ² = 0.035 
n = 756 
100 left censored obs 
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